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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, a growing number of countries have adopted new
laws and other mechanisms to address a gap in national criminal legal
systems: the absence of meaningful procedures to raise post-conviction
claims of factual innocence. These legal and policy reforms have responded
to a global surge of exonerations facilitated by the growth of national
innocence organizations that increasingly collaborate across borders. It is
striking that these developments have occurred with little direct help from
international law. Although many treaties recognize extensive fair trial and
appeal rights, no international human rights instrument—in its text, existing
interpretation, or implementation—explicitly and fully recognizes the right
to assert a claim of factual innocence. We label this omission international
law’s innocence gap. The gap appears increasingly anomalous given how
foundational innocence protection has become at the national level, as well
as international law’s longstanding commitment to the presumption of
innocence, fair trial, and other criminal process guarantees. We argue the
time has come to close this innocence gap by recognizing a new international
human right to assert post-trial claims of factual innocence.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, a growing number of countries have established
mechanisms for persons convicted of crimes to raise post-trial claims of
innocence.1 Take the example of Taiwan, which experienced its first DNA
exoneration in 2014, when the Taiwan High Court granted Long-Qi Chen a
retrial after serving four years in prison.2 In response, Taiwanese lawmakers
promptly revised the standard for reopening a conviction to make clear that
“new evidence”—either alone or considered as part of the totality of the
circumstances—is grounds for reversing a criminal conviction.3 Many other
countries have similarly enacted new laws or taken other steps to address a
longstanding gap in national criminal legal systems: the absence of a
meaningful procedure to raise post-conviction claims of innocence.4 These
national legal and policy reforms have responded to a global surge in
exonerations, including high-profile and capital cases in Australia, China,
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.5
Exonerations in these and other states have been facilitated by the
growth of national innocence organizations, which have secured
exonerations for wrongful convictions in many jurisdictions.6 For example,
in the United States, more than 370 convictions have been overturned based
on post-conviction DNA testing,7 resulting in an “innocence movement.”8
1. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Towards an International Right to Claim Innocence, 105
CALIF. L. REV. 1173 (2017) (describing the rise in national-level adoption of post-conviction innocence
claims).
2. See Case: B03陳龍綺 Chen, Long-Qi, TAIWAN INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://twinnocence
project.org/en/case/chen-long-qi [https://perma.cc/PY6M-UDWJ]; see also Garrett, supra note 1, at
1210–11.
3. For discussions of the Long-Qi Chen case and the statutory reforms it prompted, see Case:
B03陳龍綺 Chen, Long-Qi, supra note 2. See also CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE art. 420 (Taiwan),
https://law.moj.gov.tw/ENG/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=C0010001 [https://perma.cc/FJN2-V3WL].
4. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1173–74.
5. See infra Section I.B.
6. See Network Member Organization Locator and Directory, INNOCENCE NETWORK,
https://innocencenetwork.org/directory
[https://perma.cc/5GTM-E4LA]
(describing
sixty-eight
independent member organizations on four continents); see also Exonerations, INNOCENCE CAN.,
https://www.innocencecanada.com/exonerations [https://perma.cc/53UU-ZA3Q] (“Innocence Canada
has helped to exonerate 24 innocent people since 1993.”); Exonerations, RED INOCENTE,
https://redinocente.org/exoneraciones-red [https://perma.cc/377C-Y9LZ] (listing exonerations in a range
of Latin American countries).
7. See DNA Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.
org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/VC9Q-F3ST]; Convicting the Innocent: DNA
Exonerations Database, DUKE L. WILSON CTR. FOR SCI. & JUST., https://www.convictingthe
innocent.com [https://perma.cc/C6G7-EEE2].
8. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 5–13 (2011) (studying the characteristics of the first 250 DNA exonerations
in the United States); Brandon L. Garrett, Convicting the Innocent Redux, in WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
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Echoed by advocacy campaigns in several other countries, this innocence
movement has now gone global.9 The resulting exonerations have attracted
substantial public and media attention in documentaries, films, podcasts, and
books,10 sparking urgent and profound debates about “the fallibility of
human justice.”11
The achievements of the transnational innocence movement are
unmistakable. Yet it is equally striking that these achievements have
occurred with little direct help from international law. Although numerous
human rights treaties recognize detailed rights to a fair trial and to appeal, no
international instrument—in its text, existing interpretation, or
implementation—has fully and explicitly recognized the right to assert a
claim of innocence following a criminal conviction and sentence.12 We argue
that human rights treaties are capable of being—and should be—interpreted
to protect such a right. To date, however, international law has fallen short
by failing to comprehensively articulate the full scope of this guarantee.
Instead, human rights law and its interpretative bodies tend to assume the
existence of national-level mechanisms to assert innocence claims, without
either mandating the creation of those mechanisms or regulating their
substantive standards or procedural safeguards.13
We label this omission international law’s “innocence gap.” The gap
appears increasingly anomalous, given how important innocence claims
have become at the national level as well as international human rights law’s
abiding commitment to the presumption of innocence and the possibility of
AND THE DNA

REVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF FREEING THE INNOCENT 40 (Daniel S. Medwed
ed., 2017) (describing updated data concerning first 330 DNA exonerations); Keith A. Findley, Toward
a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due
Process, 41 T EX . T ECH L. R EV . 133, 133–34 (2008); Emily Hughes, Innocence Unmodified, 89 N.C. L.
R EV . 1083, 1084 n.1 (2011); Marvin Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74
A LB . L. R EV . 1465, 1468 (2011).
9. See generally Mark Godsey, Introduction, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067 (2012) (introducing a
symposium on global innocence movement).
10. See generally BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE
DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); The Innocence
Files (Netflix 2020); Wrongful Conviction with Jason Flom, LAVA FOR GOOD PODCASTS, https:
//www.wrongfulconvictionpodcast.com/with-jason-flom [https://perma.cc/STB4-769F]; CONVICTION
(Fox Searchlight Pictures 2010); JUST MERCY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2019); see also FRANK R.
BAUMGARTNER, SUZANNA L. DE BOEF & AMBER E. BOYDSTUN, THE DECLINE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
AND THE DISCOVERY OF INNOCENCE (2008) (analyzing media coverage of wrongful convictions).
11. AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2014, at 6–7 (2015), https://www.
amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathSentencesAndExecutions2014_EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LVU-VHM5]
(describing 112 exonerations of death row prisoners in nine countries); see also AMNESTY INT’L,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL REPORT: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS 2017, at 8 (2018),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Death-Penalty-REPORT.pdf [https://perma.
cc/PVA7-HRSG] (describing 55 exonerations of death row prisoners in six countries).
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See infra Section II.C.
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interpreting existing treaties to recognize this right.
What explains the innocence gap in international law? Where does this
leave convicted persons who have new evidence of innocence in countries
that do not yet recognize this right? What does such recognition reveal about
current debates over so-called rights inflation? And, perhaps most important,
how would a new right to claim innocence be recognized in international
law?
This Article is among the first to ask these questions.14 We argue that
the time has come to close international law’s innocence gap by recognizing
a new human right to assert post-trial claims of factual innocence. The
recognition of such a new right has several important benefits. It reflects a
burgeoning transnational social movement and progressive changes to
national criminal laws. It consolidates recent international law developments
that, as we analyze infra, reveal a solid normative foundation for a human
right to claim innocence.15 And it advances the core values of fairness and
justice shared by domestic and international legal systems that protect civil
and political rights in general.
Arguments in favor of new rights have been made since the emergence
of international human rights law following World War II.16 Such claims are
especially fraught in the current political environment, in which
governments, civil society groups, and commentators are trenchantly
debating whether international courts and monitoring bodies have
appropriately expanded or unduly proliferated human rights. We take these
concerns seriously, but we demonstrate that the right to claim innocence can
be defended as a necessary expansion of international law’s protective reach,
whether derived from several established human rights (to life, fair trial,
appeal, remedy, and compensation for miscarriages of justice) or recognized
as a new, freestanding international right.17
14. No prior scholarship has comprehensively documented the gap in international law regarding
a post-conviction right to raise innocence claims nor argued that human rights treaties should
affirmatively recognize such a right. But see Garrett, supra note 1, at 1217–18 (noting the gap and briefly
suggesting that the right might one day be accepted in customary international law). Scholars have,
however, addressed related topics in ways that support the claims made in this Article. For example, there
is considerable research on international law requirements regarding the burden of proof and fair trial
rights, including the presumption of innocence. See, e.g., AMAL CLOONEY & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 206–16 (2021). Scholars have also analyzed the right to an
appeal and touched on its relation to preventing wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Peter D. Marshall, A
Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 D UKE J. C OMPAR . & I NT ’ L L. 1, 3 (2011). And one
recent publication has reviewed the right to compensation following an exoneration. See Jamil Ddamulira
Mujuzi, The Right to Compensation for Wrongful Conviction/Miscarriage of Justice in International Law,
8 INT’L HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 215 (2019).
15. See infra Sections III.B–C.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Section III.D.
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Part I of this Article reviews different definitions of innocence and
summarizes recent domestic law trends concerning post-trial claims of
innocence.18 We discuss three national models for constructing claims of
innocence and highlight international law’s limited direct influence on the
development and implementation of these models.19
Part II provides the analytical and empirical foundation for recognizing
a right to claim innocence in international law. We begin by cataloguing the
many advantages that are likely to flow from such recognition.20 We next
describe two primary pathways by which new international human rights
have been recognized, explain why the right to claim innocence satisfies both
of these approaches, and discuss the relative merits of each.21
Part III sets forth our proposal for closing international law’s innocence
gap. We explore the normative content of the right to claim innocence, as
well as the modalities and practical consequences of its more formal
recognition. We also consider potential objections to our proposal, including
critiques that the number and scope of internationally recognized human
rights should not be further expanded.22
A brief conclusion highlights the implications of our proposal for
efforts to redress racial disparities in wrongful convictions globally23 and,
more broadly, to reform criminal legal systems and law enforcement
practices to address racial injustice and to protect human rights.24
I. POST-TRIAL CLAIMS OF INNOCENCE IN NATIONAL LAW
This Part begins by exploring the definition of innocence claims applied
in this Article. Next, we explain how the transnational innocence movement
has pressured countries to relax and revise traditional rules of finality that
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra Sections I.A–B.
See infra Sections I.C–D.
See infra Sections II.A–B.
See infra Sections II.C–D.
See infra Section III.D.
See, e.g., NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, RACE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES ii (Samuel R. Gross ed. 2017) (“African Americans are only 13% of the American
population but a majority of innocent defendants wrongfully convicted of crimes and later exonerated.”);
CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE, JUSTICE DENIED: A GLOBAL STUDY OF
WRONGFUL DEATH ROW CONVICTIONS 11 (2018), https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.33/l8z.2c6.
myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Justice-Denied-A-Global-Study-of-Wrongful-Death-Ro
w-Convictions.pdf?time=1634328115 [https://perma.cc/7Z76-PTN2] (identifying racial and ethnic
discrimination, particularly of foreign nationals, as a risk factor for wrongful convictions).
24. See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. on Promotion and
Protection of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Africans and of People of African Descent
Against Excessive Use of Force and Other Human Rights Violations by Law Enforcement Officers, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/47/53, at 12 (2021).
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impeded the ability to raise such claims. We then set out three models by
which such claims have been recognized at the national level: a postconviction model, an appellate model, and an administrative model. Part I
concludes by highlighting the limited direct influence of international law on
the development, implementation, and transnational spread of these models,
identifying lacunae that can be filled by a new right to claim innocence.
A. DEFINING INNOCENCE CLAIMS
Cases and commentators have broadly distinguished between two types
of innocence claims: factual innocence—in which the wrong person was
convicted of a crime or no crime occurred at all—and legal innocence—
which refers to legal defects in a conviction, ranging from unfair trials and
other errors in the criminal process to evidence that is legally insufficient to
convict.25 This Article focuses primarily on international law’s gap regarding
factual innocence claims, but it also discusses legal innocence claims
involving procedural errors.
We emphasize factual innocence for both normative and strategic
reasons. These claims constitute the most urgent gap in international law.
They provide an incisive critique of finality rules and illustrate, in stark
terms, the need for post-conviction exoneration mechanisms. These claims
also, as Part II explains, have a firm textual and doctrinal foundation in
global and regional treaties, without, however, being explicitly or fully
guaranteed in those international instruments.
We recognize that legal innocence claims sometimes overlap with
claims of factual innocence. For example, the reversal of a conviction
resulting from a fair trial violation is often accompanied by a finding that the
procedural error impacted the verdict, such that no reasonable juror would
convict.26 In addition, the transnational movement, described infra, focuses
on a range of legal and factual innocence issues and confronts obstacles to
overturning wrongful convictions for both types of claims.27
Our focus on factual innocence does not seek to deter these efforts; on
the contrary, national governments and domestic innocence organizations
25. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 45 (1987) (detailing exonerations in death penalty cases in the United States
and defining category of miscarriages of justice); see also Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB.
L. REV. 1157, 1159–60 (2010) (describing different definitions of exonerations and of miscarriages of
justice). For other works providing taxonomies of definitions of innocence, see, for example, Margaret
Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 C LEV . S T . L. R EV . 449, 456 (2001); William S. Laufer, The
Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 W ASH . L. R EV . 329, 331 n.4 (1995).
26. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 M INN . L. R EV . 1629, 1684–85 (2008).
27. See infra Section I.C.
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could extend our proposal to other miscarriages of justice and gross
procedural errors. We nevertheless believe that closing international law’s
innocence gap requires—at least as a first step—explicitly recognizing
factual innocence claims in order to complement existing procedural
guarantees whose violation provides the basis for legal innocence claims.
Limiting our focus to factual innocence still raises a host of complex
questions. These include what counts as “evidence” of innocence; when such
evidence is sufficiently “new”; and whether to include cases in which a
sentence or sentencing enhancement, rather than guilt, is called into question,
as well as guilty pleas in which no evidence was presented at a trial.28
Additional issues relate to whether and in what circumstances a convicted
person later found to be innocent should receive compensation. National
jurisdictions have grappled with these issues and adopted laws to address
some of them, as we discuss in the next Section.29 Even so, the absence of
an international right to claim innocence has left gaps in these domestic laws
and impeded the transnational spread of post-conviction procedures and
sharing of best practices.30
B. THE TRANSNATIONAL INNOCENCE MOVEMENT’S FOCUS ON THE
FINALITY OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Traditionally, rules of finality in criminal proceedings have barred
relitigating factual evidence of innocence after a conviction becomes final or
a relatively short limitations period expires.31 These finality rules have,
however, eroded rapidly as government officials and judges in numerous
countries have confronted unequivocal evidence of wrongful convictions.32
These changes have been driven by “functional similarities” in the
causes of wrongful conviction determinations across jurisdictions, especially
in such emerging technologies such as DNA testing.33 Researchers have
documented exonerations in several countries, including China, Germany,
and the United States; in other countries, there is anecdotal awareness of
wrongful convictions, but comprehensive data is lacking.34 These
28. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1210.
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. We develop these arguments in detail infra Part III.
31. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993) (discussing the “disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality”).
32. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1177 (“[F]inality is entering a period of new international
ferment.”).
33. Kent Roach, Comparative Reflections on Miscarriages of Justice in Australia and Canada, 17
FLINDERS L.J. 381, 381 (2015).
34. For an effort to document exonerations worldwide, noting several recent mass exonerations of
tens of thousands of persons in England, Wales, and Germany, see Innocents Database, FOREJUSTICE,
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exonerations, whether occurring in large numbers or in high-profile cases,
have, in turn, created awareness that existing post-conviction remedies are
inadequate when new evidence of innocence arises.35
Beginning with the first innocence projects in several countries,
including the United Kingdom (with the creation of the Criminal Cases
Review Commission) and the United States (which saw several innocence
projects established by the mid-1990s), national innocence organizations
have increasingly investigated potential wrongful convictions and harnessed
DNA technology to assert claims of factual innocence.36 Today, there is not
only an Innocence Network that spans the globe but also regional networks
of innocence projects in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America.37 This
movement comprises a diverse set of actors—nongovernmental
organizations, law school clinics, pro bono attorneys at private law firms,38
and a growing number of conviction review units in prosecutors’ offices.39
Additionally, exonerees have formed organizations to advocate for legal
reforms, including broader access to remedies for innocence claims.40
http://forejustice.org/search_idb.htm [https://perma.cc/7PUX-ELWX]. For exonerations in the United
States, see Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV.
OF CAL. IRVINE NEWKIRK CTR. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH. & MICH. ST. UNIV. COLL. OF
L., https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx [https://perma.cc/
C2SU-JFZ4] (detailing over 2,500 exonerations in the United States since 1989); DUKE L. WILSON CTR.
FOR SCI. & JUST., supra note 7. For data from China, Australia, Switzerland, and Germany, see generally
Moulin Xiong & Michelle Miao, Miscarriage of Justice in Chinese Capital Cases, 41 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMPAR. L. REV. 273 (2018); Rachel Dioso-Villa, A Repository of Wrongful Convictions in Australia:
First Steps Toward Estimating Prevalence and Causal Contributing Factors, 17 FLINDERS L.J. 163
(2015); Gwladys Gilliéron, Wrongful Convictions in Switzerland: A Problem of Summary Proceedings,
80 U. CIN. L. REV. 1145 (2012); Fredericke Leuschner, Martin Rettenberger & Axel Dessecker,
Imprisoned but Innocent: Wrongful Convictions and Imprisonments in Germany, 1990-2016, 66 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 687 (2020). Many countries do not maintain accurate information on convictions
reversed on innocence grounds. See, e.g., Luca Lupária & Chiara Greco, Unveiling Wrongful Convictions
Between the U.S. and Italy: Cross-Learning from Each Other’s Mistakes, 1 WRONGFUL CONVICTION L.
REV. 101, 118 (2020) (“[T]he Italian system does not provide accurate statistics or research concerning
wrongful convictions . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Rachel Dioso-Villa, Roberta Julian, Mark Kebbell, Lynne Weathered & Nina
Westera, Investigation to Exoneration: A Systemic Review of Wrongful Conviction in Australia, 28
C URRENT I SSUES C RIM . J UST . 157, 158 (2016); Stephanie Roberts, Fresh Evidence and Factual
Innocence in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal, 81 J. C RIM . L. 303, 304–05 (2017). For efforts
to revise legal standards in a wide range of countries, see generally Garrett, supra note 1.
36. For an overview of the entire innocence movement, see generally ROBERT J. NORRIS,
EXONERATED: A HISTORY OF THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT (2017).
37. See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, supra note 6; INNOCENCE CANADA, supra note 6; RED
INOCENTE, supra note 6; see also Godsey, supra note 9, at 1067.
38. For example, the Colorado Innocence Project was formed as a consortium of pro bono law
firm lawyers. See Khorey Wise Innocence Project, C OLO . L., https://www.colorado.edu/law/academics/
public-service/korey-wise-innocence-project [https://perma.cc/2LL9-CZXN].
39. For an overview of the role that different Conviction Integrity Units, centered in prosecutors’
offices, have played in exonerations in the United States, see Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA,
supra note 34.
40. See, e.g., Meet the Change Agents, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://innocenceproject.org/change-
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The national-level changes in response to these advocacy efforts are
striking. For example, in the United States, all fifty states and the federal
government have enacted post-conviction statutes permitting access to DNA
and other new evidence of innocence, as well as relief based on a finding of
innocence.41 Recent reforms in Canada broadening judicial acceptance of
new evidence on appeal were “driven by a recognition of the role that
postconviction barriers and finality concerns played in wrongful
convictions.”42 Various other countries have adopted similar reforms.43
Despite these changes, finality still poses an obstacle to relief in many
jurisdictions—sometimes just for certain cases, such as plea bargains,44 but
also where procedural rules impose time limits, require diligence of counsel,
impose restrictions on the types of new evidence that may be considered, or
even bar consideration of new evidence altogether.45 These and other
impediments reveal that an important innocence gap remains,
notwithstanding the significant shifts in national law and policy.46
C. NATIONAL MODELS FOR RAISING INNOCENCE CLAIMS
In most national jurisdictions, the concept of innocence traditionally did
not have distinct legal significance; rather, a person was found guilty or not
guilty at a trial, while clemency could be granted in the interests of justice
based on a variety of concerns, including but not limited to innocence.47 In
recent years, however, a wide range of countries with different legal systems
agents [https://perma.cc/J6CJ-8R9X]; see also Garrett, supra note 1, at 1176–79 (describing exoneree
advocacy regarding federal legislation).
41. THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, TODAY, ALL 50 STATES HAVE DNA ACCESS LAWS, BUT MANY
DNA ACCESS LAWS HAVE LIMITATIONS 1, https://globalwrong.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/dna_
innocencenetwork_website.pdf [https://perma.cc/V6CM-NDNL]; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT & LEE
KOVARSKY, F EDERAL H ABEAS C ORPUS : E XECUTIVE D ETENTION AND P OST -C ONVICTION
L ITIGATION 164 (2013).
42. Carrie Leonetti, The Innocence Checklist, 58 A M . C RIM . L. R EV . 97, 115 (2020).
43. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1177.
44. See, e.g., Rebecca Stephens, Disparities in Postconviction Remedies for Those Who Plead
Guilty and Those Convicted at Trial: A Survey of State Statutes and Recommendations for Reform, 103
J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 309, 320–21 (2013).
45. See, e.g., David Hamer, Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need
for a Criminal Cases Review Commission, 37 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 270, 288 (2014); see also Daniel S.
Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly Discovered Non-DNA
Evidence in State Courts, 47 A RIZ . L. R EV . 655, 685–86 (2005). More generally, scholarship has
described post-conviction procedure as unduly complex and inadequate. See generally, e.g., Eve Brensike
Primus, Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions: A Structural Approach to Adequacy Doctrine,
116 M ICH . L. R EV . 75 (2017).
46. See, e.g., Huang Shiyuan, Chinese Wrongful Convictions: Discovery and Rectification, 80 U.
C IN . L. R EV . 1195, 1195–96 (2012) (describing the need for a “more effective mechanism in China to
discover and rectify erroneous cases”).
47. Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 R UTGERS L. R EV . 1317, 1322–23 (1997).
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and criminal procedures have modified their appeal and post-conviction
review mechanisms to allow defendants to seek review and relief based on
new evidence of innocence.48 These mechanisms, often adopted in response
to efforts by the transnational advocacy networks discussed supra, have led
to a growing number of exonerations of individuals whose factual innocence
claims were upheld.
Drawing on existing scholarship, we describe three basic models for
asserting these innocence claims: (1) a post-conviction model, in which a
separate legal mechanism permits a challenge to a conviction after appeals
are exhausted; (2) an appellate model, which broadly distinguishes between
civil and common law approaches; and (3) an administrative model, in which
a dedicated government agency reviews innocence claims. We also indicate
where international human rights law has (or, more often, has not)
meaningfully influenced these models.
1. The Post-Conviction Model
Numerous countries provide for a separate collateral procedure,
unrelated to the trial and appeal, to a challenge a criminal conviction. The
common law writ of habeas corpus, which developed largely in the pretrial
context, has been repurposed as a post-conviction mechanism, mainly via
statutes but also in constitutional provisions.49 Many countries in Latin
America recognize a separate judicial writ, the amparo de libertad. In other
countries, common law writs, such as coram nobis, and statutory
mechanisms can be used to litigate new evidence after a conviction.50
In the United States, post-conviction claims of innocence have been
facilitated through state and federal post-conviction statutes unaided by the
federal constitution or international law. In Herrera v. Collins, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to recognize a freestanding constitutional claim of
actual innocence, noting that doing so would have a “disruptive effect . . . on
the need for finality . . . .”51 At the time of that decision, in the early 1990s,
only two states recognized a right of access to post-conviction DNA testing
to prove factual innocence.52 In the decades since, finality rules have been
relaxed significantly. In response to thousands of exonerations, over three
hundred of which involved DNA testing, all fifty states and the federal
48. See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 9, at 1067.
49. See GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 41, at 1–3. Habeas corpus is also a constitutionally
recognized remedy in Ireland. CONSTITUTION OF IRELAND art. 40, https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/
eli/cons/en/html [https://perma.cc/CLG9-YRKE].
50. See GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 41, at 1–2; Steven J. Mulroy, The Safety Net: Applying
Coram Nobis Law to Prevent the Execution of the Innocent, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 1 (2003).
51. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
52. See Garrett, supra note 26, at 1631, 1646–50, 1673–75.
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government enacted statutes permitting post-conviction access to DNA and
other evidence of innocence and creating procedures for seeking relief based
on that evidence.53 Most states and the federal government have also adopted
statutes that provide compensation to wrongly convicted persons.54 There is,
however, no consistent national standard for making these claims nor for
determining what type of or how much compensation is appropriate.
These statutes have also arisen in isolation from international human
rights law. The United States has ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). As we explain infra, although the ICCPR
does not require States parties to provide a mechanism for post-conviction
review of innocence claims, it does recognize a right to compensation for
miscarriages of justice. However, due to the treaty’s non-self-executing
status in the U.S. legal system, no state or federal court has applied the
ICCPR when reviewing wrongful convictions.55
2. The Appellate Model
In most countries, convictions may be challenged at one or more levels
of an appeal, but there is no general mechanism for collateral post-conviction
review. Instead, some jurisdictions have rules that permit the introduction of
new evidence of innocence during appeals.
In civil law countries, appeals have long been considered a fundamental
right.56 The appellate process is typically, however, confined to questions of
law and the factual record at trial.57 A distinct, and more limited, appellate
process for reopening a case once ordinary remedies are concluded is termed
a revision.58 Countries have expanded both types of appeals to include claims
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence.59
France, for example, made significant changes to its revision statute in
1989 and 2014 in response to high-profile wrongful conviction cases and to
53. See THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, supra note 41; GARRETT & KOVARSKY, supra note 41.
54. See Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, supra note 34 (providing a primer on state and
federal compensation statutes and linking to an Innocence Project spreadsheet surveying exoneration
compensation statutes in fifty states).
55. The ICCPR has been considered by U.S. courts only rarely, and mostly in relation to the death
penalty and sentences of juvenile life without parole. See Connie de la Vega, Using International Human
Rights Standards to Effect Criminal Justice Reform in the United States, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2015--vol--41/vol--41--no--2---human-rights-at-home/using-international-human-rights-standards-to-effect-criminalju [https://perma.cc/F7MU-Y6VL].
56. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 1, 11, 15.
57. See id. at 15.
58. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1202–03.
59. See id. at 1645–51 (providing overview of innocence claims and their evolution in civil law
countries).
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facilitate claims based on new evidence of innocence.60 Judges had
interpreted the prior standard to require “serious” doubt; lawmakers
reinforced that even the “slightest” doubt sufficed.61 China has also adopted
sweeping changes in criminal procedure statutes and court rules over the past
several decades, creating several appellate avenues for reopening
convictions, including based on newly discovered evidence.62 Appeals and
revisions in both countries involve a proceeding before judges, who consider
newly introduced facts as part of the record.
The greater burdens of trials in common law jurisdictions (including
live witness testimony and determination of guilt by jurors) have long
engendered resistance to reopening convictions based on new evidence of
innocence.63 Yet the movement to develop modern systems of criminal
appeals arose in common law countries out of a “concern over the incidence
of wrongful convictions.”64 More recently, several jurisdictions have
responded to wrongful convictions by altering their finality rules, in some
instances reflecting the influence of international human rights law.
In the United Kingdom, for example, lawmakers adopted appellate
reforms in response to prominent cases, including the Birmingham Six and
Guildford Four.65 In 1995, the United Kingdom amended the standard for
appeal to include “unsafe” convictions, permitting a claim based on evidence
of innocence that is not conclusive or such that no reasonable juror could
convict.66 Subsequently, international law influenced the adoption of a more
flexible “unsafe” conviction standard. In Condron v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) interpreted the European
60. See, e.g., CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 622
(Fr.); see also Katrien Verhesschen & Cyrille Fijnaut, Correcting Wrongful Convictions in France: Has
the Act of 2014 Opened the Door to Revision?, 4 E RASMUS L. R EV . 22, 22 (2020).
61. Verhesschen & Fijnaut, supra note 60, at 24.
62. See Zhong Hua Ren Ming Gong Huh Guo Sing Shi Su Song Fa (中华人民共和国刑事诉讼
法) [Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980), ch. III, art. 136. (setting out process for
appeal); see also Garrett, supra note 1, at 1197 (providing overview of process); Margaret Y.K. Woo,
The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People’s Republic of China, 14 Y ALE J. I NT ’ L L. 118, 123–34
(1989) (providing detailed history of appeals in China).
63. See Marshall, supra note 14, at 10 (recounting finality concerns as objections to expanding
appeals in common law countries).
64. Id. at 3.
65. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, at iii (UK)
(recommending the creation of the Criminal Case Review Commission (“CCRC”) to replace the Criminal
Case Unit of the Home Office); Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United Kingdom
and the United States Review Claims of Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 107, 108 & n.8 (2009); Jacqueline
S. Hodgson, The Future of Adversarial Criminal Justice in 21st Century Britain, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REGUL. 319, 325–26 (2010).
66. BEN EMMERSON, ANDREW ASHWORTH, ALISON MACDONALD, ANDREW L-T CHOO & MARK
SUMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 21, 36–38 (3d ed. 2012).
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Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) as mandating appellate review of
the overall fairness of criminal trials.67 In response, the U.K. Parliament
adopted the Criminal Justice Act of 2003, opening additional avenues for
retrials based on a broader category of “new and compelling evidence.”68
In Australia, courts can overturn “unsafe” convictions not supported by
the evidence, but their inquiry is confined to the facts available at the time of
trial.69 Appeals are only permitted on questions of law, and once a final
decision is entered, the case cannot be reopened.70 While intermediate
appellate courts can examine “fresh evidence,” that is, evidence not
introduced at trial, the High Court has long been prohibited from such
review.71 As a result, no recourse exists if the intermediate court denies
relief.72 In academic writings, former High Court Judge Michael Kirby has
argued that this gap impedes justice.73
In 2013, responding to international human rights concerns regarding
the right to appeal, lawmakers in the State of South Australia expanded the
opportunities to introduce new evidence of innocence in second or
subsequent appeals before that state’s supreme court.74 The basis for such an
appeal is “fresh and compelling evidence” to be considered “in the interests
of justice.”75 Similar appellate reforms were enacted in Tasmania and
Victoria, and a number of exonerations resulted from the use of these statutes
67. Condron v. United Kingdom, App No. 35718/97, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2000),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58798 [https://perma.cc/7XTV-KYZR].
68. See Criminal Justice Act 2003, c. 44, §§ 78, 79(2) (UK).
69. See AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, INQUIRY INTO THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
BILL 2010 ¶ 18 (2011), https://humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/legal/submissions/2011/
20111125_criminal_case_review.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8NP-SPUS].
70. Grierson v. The King (1938) 60 CLR 431, 435 (Austl.); see Re Matthews, [1973] VR 199, 210–
11 (Austl.) (discussing policy reasons for ensuring the finality of jury verdicts).
71. AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 69, ¶¶ 20–21.
72. See Mickelberg v. The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259, ¶ 9; AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra
note 69, ¶ 21.
73. See Michael Kirby, Black and White Lessons for the Australian Judiciary, 23 ADEL. L. REV.
195, 206 (2002); AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 69, ¶ 22.
74. See Michael Kirby, A New Right of Appeal as a Response to Wrongful Convictions: Is It
Enough?, 43 CRIM. L.J. 299, 302–03 (2019) (observing that the new amendment enacting a right to
second or subsequent appeal responded to an Australian Human Rights Commission report finding that
Australia’s system of criminal appeals did not comply with the ICCPR). The new provisions were enacted
in 2013 in the Statutes Amendment Appeals Act 2013, which inserted Section 353A in the Criminal
Consolidation Act of 1935. Id. at 299 n.1. The provisions were later repealed and reenacted as Section
159 in the Criminal Procedure Act 1921. For more information, see Robert N. Moles & Bibi Sangha,
Australian New Right of Appeal Homepage, NETWORKED KNOWLEDGE, http://netk.net.au/Appeals
Home.asp [https://perma.cc/ZS4C-XMGH].
75. Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (S. Austl.) s 159(1). These are defined as: “(6) For the purposes
of subsection (1), evidence relating to an offence is—(a) fresh if—(i) it was not adduced at the trial of the
offence; and (ii) it could not, even with the exercise of reasonable diligence, have been adduced at the
trial; and (b) compelling if—(i) it is reliable; and (ii) it is substantial; and (iii) it is highly probative in the
context of the issues in dispute at the trial of the offence.” Id. at s 159(6).
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in high-profile cases.76 However, the Australian High Court has continued to
interpret these statutes narrowly and limit appeals raising innocence claims,
and other state jurisdictions in Australia have not enacted similar laws.77
3. The Administrative Model
Several common law and civil law countries have established
administrative bodies to investigate potential wrongful convictions and
request courts to reopen cases based on claims of factual innocence.78 The
structure of these bodies varies. One example on the formal end of the
spectrum is the United Kingdom’s Criminal Case Review Commission
(“CCRC”), the first of its kind in the world.79 The CCRC was not explicitly
informed by international human rights law.80
Other countries use less formal bodies and methods to review
convictions and secure judicial release for prisoners who raise new evidence
of innocence. In China, for example, Politics and Law Committees and
People’s Congresses can refer concerns regarding criminal convictions to
judges.81 In Canada, legislation enacted in 2002 authorizes a defendant
whose appeals are exhausted to apply to the Minister of Justice to investigate
a claim of innocence.82 Nonbinding guidelines—modeled on right to
compensation for miscarriages of justice in the ICCPR, discussed in detail
infra—establish criteria that a wrongfully convicted person must meet to be
entitled to this remedy.83 In the Netherlands, a 2012 amendment to the Dutch
Code of Criminal Procedure permits the defense to request that the Attorney
General investigate a case based on a novum—“a new fact not known to the
judge at the time of trial.”84
A decade ago in Australia, a national administrative body, the
Australian Human Rights Commission reviewed a proposal to adopt a U.K.76. See Kirby, supra note 74, at 303–04.
77. See id. at 305 (criticizing these developments).
78. See ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 65, at i (recommending the creation of the
CCRC to replace the Criminal Case Unit of the Home Office, under which the Home Secretary could
order new investigations of criminal cases for referral to the Court of Appeal); Garrett, supra note 1, at
1212–13; Griffin, supra note 65, at 118–21.
79. For the first substantial empirical study of the CCRC’s work, see generally CAROLYN HOYLE
& MIA SATO, REASONS TO DOUBT: WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMMISSION (2019).
80. See ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 65, at i (describing impetus for the creation
of the CCRC).
81. See Garrett, supra note 1, at 1197–98.
82. See Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions in Canada, 80 U. C IN . L. R EV . 1465, 1482–89 (2012).
83. See Hinse v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2015] 2 S.C.R. 621, 660 (Can. Que. S.C.C.). We discuss
the guidelines in Section II.C.4 infra.
84. Garrett, supra note 1, at 1208.
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style CCRC.85 Emphasizing that the overarching goals of the relevant
provision of the ICCPR “operate[] to ensure that no individual is deprived,
in procedural terms, of his or her right to claim justice,”86 the Commission
concluded that “[t]he current system of criminal appeals in Australia for a
person who has been wrongfully convicted or who has been subject to a gross
miscarriage of justice to challenge their conviction may not be fully
compatible with the right to a fair trial” in the ICCPR.87 Although the
Commission identified a CCRC-type administrative body as one mechanism
to comply with international human rights standards, no such body has been
created in response to its recommendation.88
D. THE LIMITED INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON NATIONAL
MODELS
The three models discussed supra illustrate the wide range of
institutions and procedures that countries use to review innocence claims. In
some jurisdictions, such review is consolidated with the appellate process.
In others, it is formally independent from that process, but the same judges
adjudicate collateral proceedings. In still other countries, separate
administrative bodies investigate and recommend relief based on claims of
innocence, which are then typically referred back to national judges. In sum,
there is no single way to adapt innocence claims to domestic criminal
procedures.
This diversity reflects the fact that the national models developed
organically in response to a common problem—wrongful convictions—that
was, nonetheless, experienced quite differently due to variations in domestic
criminal proceedings. Government officials, civil society groups, and
scholars studied the approaches of other countries, learned from their
successes and failures, and, in some instances, modified national models in
light of the information they learned.89 However, these bottom-up and
horizontal processes of law reform and policy diffusion occurred with
limited input from international human rights law.
In other areas of the criminal process—such as fair trial guarantees—
85. See Bibi Sangha & Bob Moles, The Right to a Fair Trial in the Context of International Human
Rights Obligations, DIRECT LINK: NSW DIST. & LOC. CTS. PRAC. NEWSL., Aug. 2011, at 112, 112.
86. AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N, supra note 69, ¶ 10.
87. Id. ¶ 31.
88. Kirby, supra note 74, at 302.
89. See generally WRONGFUL CONVICTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON MISCARRIAGES
OF JUSTICE (C. Ronald Huff & Martin Killias eds., 2008); see also MIRANDA JOLICOEUR, NAT’L INST.
OF JUST., INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: WORKSHOP REPORT 5 (2010)
(examining “how other countries . . . are handling wrongful convictions . . . to determine possible best
practices that could be adapted for the U.S. system to prevent and correct wrongful convictions”).
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human rights treaties are specific and detailed, establishing an international
baseline of protection that has influenced all national legal systems.90 In the
absence of a bespoke right to claim innocence, however, international law
has had less influence on national models for addressing wrongful
convictions, especially regarding claims of factual innocence.
Human rights treaties have been invoked to justify some criminal law
reforms in a few common law countries, most notably in the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Elsewhere, however, there is little
evidence of international human rights law’s footprint; instead, domestic
responses to exonerations and miscarriages of justice have largely driven
reforms.91
Before setting forth our proposal to remedy this omission, we first
explain how a right to claim innocence can be derived from existing
international standards and can also satisfy the standard for recognition as a
new, freestanding human right.
II. TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHT TO CLAIM
INNOCENCE
This Part lays the foundation for protecting post-conviction innocence
claims in international law. After reviewing the advantages that flow from
identifying a legal claim as an internationally protected right, we consider
where the right to claim innocence fits within typologies for recognizing
“new” human rights. For example, can the right be derived from an
interpretation of rights that already govern criminal trials, appeals, and
compensation for miscarriages of justice?92 Does it constitute a new, standalone human right?93 Or can the right be recognized by drawing upon both
perspectives? We conclude by discussing the implications of recognizing the
right to claim innocence under each approach.
90. See generally DOVYDAS VITKAUSKAS & GRIGORIY DIKOV, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS (2d ed. 2017) (providing comprehensive guidance regarding the text and interpretation
of Article 6 of the ECHR).
91. See generally Garrett, supra note 1 (describing the role, across a range of jurisdictions, that
wrongful convictions played in relaxing barriers to consideration of new evidence of innocence); see also
Roach, supra note 33, at 381.
92. For further information, see Mart Susi, Novelty in New Human Rights: The Decrease in
Universality and Abstractness Thesis, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS:
RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC 21, 31 (Andreas von Arnauld & Kerstin von der Decken eds., 2020).
93. See id. at 25.
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A. THE ADVANTAGES OF RECOGNIZING A RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The growing number of countries that allow defendants to raise postconviction innocence claims reveals that national innocence organizations
have been quite effective in convincing governments to recognize and
expand such mechanisms. These developments have occurred, as we have
shown, with only limited influence from international law. It is thus fair to
ask whether the transnational innocence movement needs international
human rights law. Or, to pose the question slightly less provocatively, what
would defendants and innocence groups gain from the recognition of an
express right to claim innocence in international law?
We answer these questions by drawing upon a rich literature that
identifies the symbolic, strategic, normative, and enforcement benefits of
explicitly recognizing a right in international law—for the individuals who
claim rights, for the civil society groups who advocate for recognition, and
for society more broadly.94
1. Symbolic Benefits
Perhaps most basically, identifying something as an international
human right acknowledges the need to prioritize its realization.95 It reframes
a mere political aspiration as a mandatory entitlement that can be achieved,
particularly via legal claims and accountability mechanisms.96 This
reframing extends beyond the individuals and groups who benefit from the
right. International laws and processes have expressive values that can
influence state preferences, shaping normative beliefs about the nature of a
problem and the need to address it.97
International recognition can also engender a range of “paradigm
shift[s]” that enhance the legitimacy and power of rights-holders.98 These
include changing discourse from “one of charity to one of entitlement”99 and
94. See Andreas von Arnauld & Jens T. Theilen, Rhetoric of Rights, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 92, at 34, 39–48 (outlining five functions of human
rights rhetoric).
95. Virginia A. Leary, The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law, 1 HEALTH & HUM.
RTS. 24, 36 (1994).
96. Benjamin Mason Meier, Georgia Lyn Kayser, Urooj Quezon Amjad & Jamie Bartram,
Implementing an Evolving Human Right Through Water and Sanitation Policy, 15 WATER POL’Y 116,
117 (2013).
97. Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND.
L. REV. 77, 97 (2007).
98. Marthe Fredvang & Simon Biggs, The Rights of Older Persons: Protection and Gaps Under
Human Rights Law 18–19 (Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y, Social Policy Working Paper No. 16, 2012), https://
social.un.org/ageing-working-group/documents/fourth/Rightsofolderpersons.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC8
S-G4C3].
99. Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
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enhancing expectations of compliance.100 In the context of wrongful
convictions, these shifts can result in defendants being viewed not as passive
recipients of government clemency or mercy, but as rights-holders who are
entitled to present new evidence of innocence to appropriate
decisionmakers.101
2. Strategic Benefits
Express recognition as an international human right also has numerous
strategic advantages. These include serving as a tool for social
movements;102 raising the visibility of individuals who have experienced
injustice; increasing education and awareness;103 promoting the
identification of shared goals; building broader alliances and more effective
advocacy strategies, both within a single state and across borders;104 and
enhancing the institutional, legal, financial, and other support needed to
realize the relevant right. These advantages, both individually and in
combination, have the potential to further strengthen the transnational
innocence movement.
Recognition also locates the right within existing international legal
frameworks that contain well-understood obligations for countries, such as
the duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the right.105 These frameworks also
identify specific duty-bearers—such as state agencies and officials—who
become the focus of legal and political advocacy, alongside
nongovernmental actors who may also be amenable to rights-based claims.
This identification enhances the ability of rights-holders and their supporters
to hold these actors accountable for violations and pressure them to take
957, 973 (2004).
100. See Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 121, 128, 131 (2001); Leary, supra note 95, at 39; see also Kristen David Adams, Do We Need
a Right to Housing?, 9 NEV. L.J. 275, 300–01 (2009) (“[H]uman rights . . . carry power and legitimacy
that motivate governments to create and sustain programs to put those rights into action.”).
101. See Bluemel, supra note 99, at 973; see also Meier et al., supra note 96, at 117 (finding that
the rights-language changes the conception of individuals as being “passive recipients of government
benevolence”); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human
Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 331, 341 (2005) (“Establishing
water as a right puts people in the center of development as opposed to passive recipients.”).
102. Andrew Keane Woods, Discounting Rights, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 509, 516 (2018)
(“Rights can also be a language for articulating grievances, a tool for building a social movement, a
specific aspirational goal for the country[,] . . . a general aspirational goal[,] . . . and more.”).
103. See Edward Halle, The Rights of Older Persons and the Need for a New Convention 38 (May
9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3176330 [https://perma.cc/
CD3R-TPG5]); Fredvang & Biggs, supra note 98, at 18.
104. See Meier et al., supra note 96, at 123.
105. See Arjun Sengupta, Right to Development as a Human Right, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2527,
2530 (2001); Tatyana A. Margolin, Abortion as a Human Right, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 77, 79 (2007);
Hardberger, supra note 101, at 361.
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proactive steps to realize the right and remedy violations.106
3. Normative Benefits
Recognition of a right as protected by international law can also help to
close domestic protection gaps. Although we have highlighted the
transnational innocence movement’s successes, it is also worth underscoring
that some countries continue to adhere to traditional finality rules that make
it difficult or impossible to raise new evidence of factual innocence.107
Moreover, several countries that have created procedures for introducing
such evidence have, as previously explained, not done so comprehensively
or sufficiently. As a result, the ability to raise innocence claims following a
conviction—and the likelihood of exonerations—varies widely across
national jurisdictions, even for similarly situated defendants.
International recognition of a right to claim innocence can help to
remedy these deficiencies in several ways. It can identify minimum
standards of protection that should apply regardless of which national model
a state follows, such as ensuring recognition of factual innocence claims
alongside legal ones. It can also facilitate consistent interpretations of similar
legal standards and encourage the spread of policy innovation across
borders.108 As legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies monitor and
respond to developments elsewhere, these trends may, over time, generate
an influential set of best practices for other countries to follow.
4. Enforcement Benefits
Lastly, international recognition can encourage enforcement of a
right.109 National courts in some countries give direct effect to international
human rights standards; in others, courts interpret constitutions and statutes
to avoid conflicts with those standards.110 This is true not only for treaties
and customary law but also for nonbinding international norms.111
106. See Ling-Yee Huang, Note, Not Just Another Drop in the Human Rights Bucket: The Legal
Significance of a Codified Human Right to Water, 20 FLA. J. INT’L L. 353, 361 (2008); INGA T. WINKLER,
Benefits of Understanding Water as a Human Right, in THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: SIGNIFICANCE,
LEGAL STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WATER ALLOCATION 212, 217, 224 (2012).
107. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1, at 1187 (“[T]here is no established standard in India for
reversing a conviction based on new evidence of innocence.”); id. at 1207 (noting that in Mexico
“remedies involving newly discovered evidence of innocence remain extremely narrow”).
108. See Bluemel, supra note 99, at 972 (finding that the recognition of a right can “provide greater
clarity and consistency in interpretation, leading to greater State compliance and clearer complainant
rights to remedies”); Halle, supra note 103, at 37 (observing that human rights can bring “clarity,
coherence and standard” regarding the protection of rights).
109. Cassel, supra note 100, at 128–29.
110. Yonatan Lupu, Pierre-Hugues Verdier & Mila Versteeg, The Strength of Weak Review:
National Courts, Interpretive Canons, and Human Rights Treaties, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 507, 511 (2019).
111. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & René Urueña, International Transformative
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A related advantage concerns monitoring and enforcement before
global and regional bodies. The system of international human rights
protection encompasses multiple venues, including litigation before regional
courts and commissions, review of complaints and State party reports by
treaty bodies, factfinding and reporting by the U.N. special procedures, and
periodic review of all U.N. members before the U.N. Human Rights
Council.112 Recognition of a right enables individuals and civil society
groups to engage with this extensive network of monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms.113 Such engagement, in turn, can pressure governments to
modify their laws and policies, incorporate rights protections into domestic
legal systems, and provide meaningful redress for violations.114 Several
recent studies have found international human rights laws and institutions to
be effective in achieving these outcomes.115
*******
As applied to the right to claim innocence, the combined effect of
symbolic, strategic, normative, and enforcement benefits can create a
positive feedback loop that, over time, leads to a reduction in the number of
wrongful convictions globally. However, simply asserting the existence of
an international right to claim innocence does not guarantee this result. To
gain widespread acceptance, such a claim must be carefully grounded in
existing frameworks for recognizing human rights. We describe infra the two
leading frameworks for international recognition: the derivative rights and
Constitutionalism in Latin America, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 403, 432–33 (2020) (discussing application of
nonbinding human rights norms by national courts in Latin America); Machiko Kanetake, UN Human
Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies Before Domestic Courts, 67 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 201, 215 (2018)
(discussing how national courts have applied nonbinding decisions and recommendations of U.N. treaty
bodies).
112. See, e.g., Sarah Joseph & Joanna Kyriakakis, The United Nations and Human Rights, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1, 5–26 (Sarah Joseph & Adam
McBeth eds., 2010).
113. See Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 301, 301 (1991); Cassel, supra note 100, at 129; Huang, supra note 106, at 359, 361; Margolin,
supra note 105, at 80.
114. Halle, supra note 103, at 39; Fredvang & Biggs, supra note 98, at 18.
115. See generally BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (finding that “treaties can affect domestic politics in ways that tend to exert
important influence over how governments behave towards their own citizens”); Cosette D. Creamer &
Beth A. Simmons, The Proof Is in the Process: Self-Reporting Under International Human Rights
Treaties, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2020) (documenting a positive relationship between states reporting to
human rights treaty monitoring bodies and improvements in domestic human rights practices);
Christopher J. Fariss, The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship Between
Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance, 48 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 239, 266 (2017) (relying on data
to show “the ratification of human rights treaties is empirically associated with higher levels of respect
for human rights”); KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN THE
21ST CENTURY 141 (2017) (analyzing evidence “suggest[ing] that overall there is less violence and fewer
human rights violations in the world than there were in the past”).
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freestanding rights approaches. We then explain how global and regional
treaties that mandate guarantees relating to criminal proceedings—the
presumption of innocence, fair trials and appeals, and compensation for
miscarriages of justice—provide a solid normative foundation for
recognizing an international human right to claim innocence under either of
these frameworks.
B. DERIVATIVE VS. FREESTANDING APPROACHES TO RECOGNIZING NEW
HUMAN RIGHTS
Evolution and expansion are two hallmarks of international human
rights law. The number and scope of protected rights and freedoms have
enlarged over time through a range of processes, including the adoption of
new treaties, the interpretation of existing international agreements, and the
articulation of nonbinding human rights norms, or soft law. There are,
nonetheless, ongoing debates over how to categorize these expansions,116 the
degree to which they can accurately be labeled as novel,117 and whether they
are desirable or even permissible.118
Within these debates, labeling an international right as “new” often
refers to normative shifts that enable a claim or demand to gain the status of
a separate or stand-alone human right.119 However, “newness” also
encompasses processes that identify a right as novel in scope because it is
newly implied or newly derived from existing guarantees.120 This Section
briefly outlines the two major processes for identifying “new” rights—
derivation from existing rights and freestanding rights121—to set the stage
116. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM, RESCUING HUMAN RIGHTS 58 (2019) (describing processes of
normative “interpretation, extension, and creation”); Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities Convention:
Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 498 (2008)
(referencing process of “affirmation,” “reformulation,” “extension,” and “innovation”).
117. See, e.g., Lorna McGregor, Looking to the Future: The Scope, Value and Operationalization
of International Human Rights Law, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1281, 1295 (2019) (drawing a
distinction between “the creation of entirely new legal rights and the implementation of existing rights”);
see also Susi, supra note 92, at 21; Clifford Bob, Introduction: Fighting for New Rights, in THE
INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 4 (Clifford Bob ed., 2009) (attributing
expansion to the prioritization of “long neglected” rights).
118. See, e.g., John Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law, 52 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1167, 1174 (2019); HANNUM, supra note 116, at 57.
119. See Susi, supra note 92, at 21 (“The claim of ‘novelty’ starts before and ends after the
recognition of a new human right in the family of so-called stand-alone human rights.”).
120. Başak Çalı, The Case for the Right to Meaningful Access to the Internet as a Human Right in
International Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY,
RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 276, 277 (describing pathways for “[d]eriving a new human right under
international human rights law”).
121. See Danwood M. Chirwa, Access to Water as a New Right in International, Regional and
Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS:
RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 55, 55–56; see also Pierre Thielbörger, Something
Old, Something New, Something Borrowed and Something Blue: Lessons to Be Learned from the Oldest

2021]

CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INNOCENCE GAP

333

for analyzing the right to claim innocence under both approaches.
The process of deriving a “new” right involves “identifying previously
unarticulated aspects of old human rights”122 or articulating “newly
recognized aspects of existing rights.”123 Also referred to as “auxiliary
rights,”124 “implied rights,”125 or “intersectional rights,”126 derived rights are
developed out of necessity—such as a need to ensure the realization of other
rights or as a “necessary extension” of existing rights127—and reinforced by
the ambiguous scope of existing guarantees.128
There are different means by which such derivative processes occur.
Evolutive interpretation that recognizes human rights treaties as “living
instruments” is one of the most common methods.129 Irrespective of the
technique used, however, the rights derivation approach focuses on the
relationship between the “parent”130 right and the “offspring”131 right.132
This relationship can take a number of forms, including (as we later show
for the right to claim innocence) through “combining different elements of
several different parent rights.”133 In practice, claims of “newness” for
derivative rights are often muted. Proponents of derivative rights often
of the ‘New’ Rights—the Human Right to Water, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN
RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 70, 74 (“Thus, both the way in which the
right to water was construed (namely through legal derivation) as well as the right’s normative content
(being partially civil-political, partially socio-economic in nature) certainly deserve to be considered a
novelty in international human rights law.”).
122. Kerstin von der Decken & Nikolaus Koch, Recognition of New Human Rights: Phases,
Techniques and the Approach of ‘Differentiated Traditionalism,’ in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 7, 13.
123. Holning Lau, Gender Recognition as a Human Right, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW
HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 193, 193 (“Sexual orientation
and gender identity rights are only new in the sense that they are newly recognized aspects of existing
rights.”).
124. See, e.g., CARL WELLMAN, THE PROLIFERATION OF RIGHTS: MORAL PROGRESS OR EMPTY
RHETORIC? 19 (1999).
125. Çalı, supra note 120, at 277.
126. Lea Shaver, The Right to Read, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 49 (2015) (describing
“intersectional rights” as “not truly demands for new human rights,” but rather “demands for more
focused attention to neglected issues within human rights”).
127. Stephen P. Marks, Normative Expansion of the Right to Health and the Proliferation of Human
Rights, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 97, 109 (2016).
128. Simon Rice, Bentham Redux: Examining a Right of Access to Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 541, 548.
129.
See Birgit Schlütter, Aspects of Human Rights Interpretation by the UN Treaty Bodies, in UN
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 261, 265 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds.,
2012); Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 739, 739 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
130. PIERRE THIELBÖRGER, THE RIGHT(S) TO WATER: THE MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE OF A
UNIQUE HUMAN RIGHT 69 (2014).
131. von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13.
132. See Thielbörger, supra note 121, at 73.
133. Id.
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describe them in ways that acknowledge their novelty while emphasizing
their close connections to established rights.134
The path to recognizing a separate, freestanding right is more difficult,
both as a conceptual and as a practical matter.135 The relationship between
stand-alone rights and existing guarantees can be quite attenuated. Standalone rights are often asserted precisely because established rights fall far
short of the protections needed, such as by not extending to certain
marginalized groups.136 To provide such protection, the new right
“strengthens a specific aspect of the established human right to the degree
that its separation . . . is justified.”137 Thus, a stand-alone right emerges
because the need for “adequate protection” cannot be achieved through
evolutionary interpretation or progressive implementation of existing
rights.138
There are no definitive criteria for recognizing new stand-alone human
rights. However, the U.N. General Assembly and commentators have
proposed various “quality control” standards to assess new rights claims.139
We analyze these standards infra and apply them to assess claims for a new,
freestanding right to claim innocence.
C. THE RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE AS A DERIVATIVE RIGHT
This Section applies the derivative rights approach to show that existing
human rights treaties and international jurisprudence can be applied to
protect a right to claim innocence. Since its inception, international human
rights law has protected a wide range of fairness guarantees in criminal
proceedings. These guarantees were first set forth in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) and later defined and extended in
the ICCPR and in regional human rights agreements, such as the ECHR.
Several provisions of these international instruments—in particular, the
rights to life, fair trial, appeal, a remedy, and compensation for miscarriages
of justice—provide a solid normative foundation for recognizing a derivative
right to assert a claim of factual innocence.
134.
135.

See, e.g., Lau, supra note 123, at 193; Shaver, supra note 126, at 49.
See Mart Susi, The Right to Be Forgotten, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN
RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 287, 288 (arguing for a framework of
novelty, recognition, and rhetoric in assessing whether a new stand-alone right exists).
136. Susi, supra note 92, at 26.
137. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 26 (finding that a new “stand-alone” human right emerges because of the need for
“adequate protection which is not achievable through broadening the scope of or simply interpreting the
respective established right is justified”).
139. Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J.
INT’L L. 607, 607 (1984).
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As currently interpreted, however, these guarantees, even when viewed
cumulatively, do not adequately protect such a right. On the contrary,
features that are central to raising factual innocence claims are strikingly
absent from, or insufficiently developed through, this suite of existing
protections. These gaps include the obligation of governments to establish a
mechanism for defendants to introduce such evidence on direct appeal or in
post-conviction judicial or administrative proceedings; the evidentiary
standards applicable in such proceedings; and the types of remedies that must
be provided to individuals whose innocence claims are upheld.140
1. The Right to Life and Restrictions on Capital Punishment
The right to life has long been recognized as inherent, non-derogable,
and essential for the enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms. Numerous
treaties require human life to be protected by law and prohibit states from
arbitrary deprivations of life.141 Early civil and political rights treaties
nevertheless recognized that capital punishment is not per se prohibited.142
However, as a growing number of countries have abolished the death
penalty, human rights standards governing capital punishment have also
evolved. This evolution is reflected in additional protocols and
supplementary treaties that expressly abrogate capital punishment, as well as
in capacious interpretations of the right to life by international tribunals and
review bodies.
The latter development is particularly reflected in the jurisprudence of
the U.N. Human Rights Committee (“UNHRC”), a body of eighteen
independent experts that monitors compliance with the ICCPR by evaluating
reports from States parties, reviewing individual complaints, and issuing
authoritative interpretations. In General Comment No. 36 on the right to life,
adopted in 2018,143 the UNHRC explained that the ICCPR sets out “specific
safeguards for ensuring that in States parties which have not yet abolished
the death penalty, it must not be applied except for the most serious crimes,
140. We discuss how these gaps might be filled in Part III infra.
141. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected
by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”); see also Org. of African Unity [OAU], African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 4, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (Oct. 21,
1986); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 2(1), Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
142. See, e.g., ECHR, supra note 141, art. 2(1) (“No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty
is provided by law.”).
143. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 36: Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018) [hereinafter
General Comment No. 36].
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and then only in the most exceptional cases and under the strictest limits.”144
Those limits include the ICCPR’s fair trial and due process guarantees, such
as reliance on forced confessions, the inability of the accused to question
relevant witnesses, disregard of the presumption of innocence, and
restrictions on the right to appeal.145
The UNHRC has long held that imposing a sentence of death following
a criminal proceeding infected by such procedural flaws is an arbitrary
deprivation of life. Burdyko v. Belarus, a 2015 decision, provides a
representative example. The defendant in the case was subjected to physical
and psychological pressure to confess to capital crimes, denied the assistance
of a lawyer for pretrial investigations, and shackled and kept in a metal cage
during the subsequent criminal trial.146 In addition to finding violations of
the ICCPR’s torture and fair trial provisions, the UNHRC held that Belarus
had breached the right to life by sentencing the applicant to death after an
unfair trial. The UNHRC reiterated its longstanding position that a sentence
of death may be imposed only in accordance with “the procedural guarantees
[protected by the ICCPR], including the right to a fair hearing by an
independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the minimum
guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher tribunal.”147
In General Comment No. 36, building on Burdyko and earlier decisions,
the UNHRC recognized for the first time an explicit link between wrongful
convictions, post-conviction review, and the right to life:
The execution of sentenced persons whose guilt has not been established
beyond reasonable doubt also constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life.
States parties must therefore take all feasible measures in order to avoid
wrongful convictions in death penalty cases, to review procedural barriers
to reconsideration of convictions and to re-examine past convictions on
the basis of new evidence, including new DNA evidence.148

This statement is noteworthy for moving beyond the procedural
144. Id. ¶ 5.
145. Id. ¶ 41. ICCPR Article 6(4)—the right to seek pardon or commutation of a death sentence—
is also relevant. ICCPR, supra note 141, art.6(4). Individuals sentenced to death must be able “to initiate
pardon or commutation procedures and to make representations about their personal or other relevant
circumstances.” General Comment No. 36, supra note 143, ¶ 47.
146. Burdyko v. Belarus, CCPR/C/114/D/2017/2010, Communication No. 2017/2010, ¶¶ 8.2–8.5
(U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Sept. 25, 2015).
147. Id. ¶ 8.6 (alterations in original).
148. See General Comment No. 36, supra note 143, ¶ 43 (footnote omitted). In support of this
interpretation, the UNHRC cited to its 2014 Concluding Observations on the report of the United States,
in which the Committee expressed concern at “the high number of persons wrongly sentenced to death,
despite existing safeguards, and by the fact that 16 retentionist states do not provide for compensation for
persons who are wrongfully convicted, while other states provide for insufficient compensation.” U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (Apr. 23, 2014).
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guarantees that support legal innocence claims to focus on how states should
respond to defendants who allege factual innocence. The statement also lays
a strong normative foundation for recognizing the right to claim innocence
as part of the right to life. Further development of the content of this right
would, for example, identify the processes that states should adopt to
reconsider capital convictions that are obtained in violation of these
procedural guarantees and subsequently challenged in light of postconviction evidence of factual innocence.149
2. The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Appeal
Numerous international instruments protect a range of guarantees
relating to the criminal process. The UDHR recognizes a right to a “fair and
public hearing” and a “right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty,” as
well as a right not to be found guilty of “any act or omission which did not
constitute a penal offence . . . at the time when it was committed” or to
receive a “heavier penalty” than that which applied at the time the offense
was committed.150 The more detailed list of criminal procedure rights in
Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR provide, inter alia, that
everyone shall have the right “to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law,”151 “to a fair and public hearing,”152 and to receive
“adequate . . . facilities”153 for preparing a criminal defense, including
access to “exculpatory material” and “material establishing innocence” in
149. See, e.g., CORNELL CTR. ON THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE, SUBMISSION TO THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE REGARDING GENERAL COMMENT NO. 36 ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, ON THE RIGHT TO LIFE, ON THE RIGHT TO
LIFE 6–7 (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CCPR/GCArticle6/Cornell
CenterontheDeathPenaltyWorldwide.docx [https://perma.cc/ZD3R-9U8W] (urging the UNHRC to
“consider adding cautionary statements with regard to other noted risk factors for wrongful convictions,
including the use of torture or coercion to obtain confessions, faulty police investigation methods, and a
lack of training and resources for defense counsel”).
150. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 10–11 (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
151. ICCPR, supra note 141, art.14(2); ECHR, supra note 141, art. 6(2). “[T]he presumption of
innocence is inherent in any proper conception of the relationship between the state and its citizens in an
open and democratic society.” Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 123 S.
AFR. L.J. 63, 73 (2006) (internal quotations omitted). The presumption “imposes on the prosecution the
burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons
accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle.” U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial,
¶ 30, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23, 2007) [hereinafter General Comment No. 32]; see also Telfner
v. Austria, App. No. 33501/96, ¶ 13 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=00159347 [https://perma.cc/5NEH-H7GT] (finding a violation of Article 6(2) of the ECHR when a domestic
court violated the presumption of innocence in that it “wrongly placed the burden of proof on the
defence”).
152. ICCPR, supra note 141, art.14(1); ECHR, supra note 141, art. 6(1).
153. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 14(3)(b).
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the prosecution’s possession.154
However, while these fair trial rights mandate procedural equality and
fairness, they do not guarantee that a domestic court “will actually reach the
correct result in one’s case.”155 It thus remains possible that an innocent
person will be convicted of a criminal offense. What concrete protection does
international human rights law offer if new evidence of innocence arises after
a first-instance conviction? The answer is somewhat uncertain, as the
discussion of the right to appeal reveals.
A “primary function of the modern right of appeal is to protect against
miscarriages of justice.”156 International human rights law emphasizes this
function by requiring appellate review of the factual or legal bases of a
conviction. For example, the UNHRC has explained that the right to appeal
in ICCPR Article 14(5) is satisfied only if an appellate court can “review
substantively, both on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence and of the law,
the conviction and sentence, such that the procedure allows for due
consideration of the nature of the case.”157 In the European human rights
system, “review by a higher court of a conviction or sentence may concern
both points of fact and points of law or be confined solely to points of law,”
provided that the appeals tribunal has “an effective role in reviewing the trial
procedures.”158 In countries “where an appellate court acts not merely as a
court of revision but has to examine a case as to the facts and the law and
make a fresh re-assessment of the issue of guilt or innocence,” the accused
must be allowed to introduce evidence and testimony “for the purpose of
proving that he did not commit the act allegedly constituting a criminal
154. General Comment No. 32, supra note 151, ¶ 33; see also Papageorgiou v. Greece, App. No.
59506/00, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 9, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61091 [https://
perma.cc/9VLL-MPGX] (finding a violation of Article 6(2) of the ECHR when a domestic court
“refus[ed] to order production of the originals of documents used as evidence for the prosecution [of the
applicant]”).
155. SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 457 (3d ed. 2013).
156. Marshall, supra note 14, at 3.
157. General Comment No. 32, supra note 151, ¶ 48. However, a “full retrial or a ‘hearing’ ” is not
required, so long as the reviewing court “can examine the factual dimensions of the case,” including
“evidence submitted at the trial and referred to in the appeal.” General Comment No. 32, supra note 151,
¶ 48.
158. Shvydka v. Ukraine, App. No. 17888/12, ¶¶ 49, 51 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 30, 2014), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-147445 [https://perma.cc/NEH6-NQ8S]. The right to appeal in criminal cases
does not appear in the ECHR itself. It was added in 1984 with the adoption of Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 22, 1984, 1525
U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter Protocol No. 7]. Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 guarantees the right to appeal in
terms that are identical to ICCPR Article 14(5). Id. art. 2. States that have not ratified Protocol No. 7 but
provide appeals in criminal cases as a matter of domestic law “must comply with the requirements of
[ECHR] article 6(1) in guaranteeing an effective right of access to the courts.” WILLIAM A. SCHABAS,
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 286 (2015).
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offence.”159
However, the right to appeal, as presently interpreted, offers only partial
protection when claims of factual innocence are raised after a conviction.
This is shown by recent decisions of the ECtHR and the UNHRC which
consider whether domestic courts must review evidence of factual innocence
after an individual has been convicted and sentenced.
In the ECtHR judgment of Lalmahomed v. Netherlands, the applicant
was charged with failing to present an identity document to the police.160
Lalmahomed contested the charge during an initial appearance, explaining
that he had been acquitted of several previous offenses because someone else
was misusing his identity.161 However, he did not show up at a subsequent
hearing, and a Dutch trial court convicted him in absentia.162 Lalmahomed
promptly challenged that conviction, but the Dutch Court of Appeal rejected
the challenge, concluding that the case file did not support his claim “that his
identity details [had been] systematically misused by someone else and that
he [had] been acquitted by the courts several times already because of
that.”163
Lalmahomed then filed an application with the ECtHR, arguing that the
denial of leave to appeal violated the right of access to a court protected by
ECHR Article 6.164 He submitted copies of the previous acquittals that were
part of the official record but were not, for unexplained reasons, included in
the case file before the Court of Appeal.165 The ECtHR concluded that the
Netherlands had violated Article 6 because the appellate tribunal had failed
to consider the factual evidence supporting “the applicant’s claim that his
identity had been misused.”166 According to the ECtHR, “the absence from
the case file of [the record of acquittals] meant that the denial of leave to
appeal . . . could not be based on a full and thorough evaluation of the
relevant factors.”167
The Lalmahomed decision applies the right to appeal to a factual
innocence claim where the evidence in support of that claim appears in the
trial record. However, other situations in which the right arises remain
159. Cani v. Albania, App. No. 11006/06, ¶ 53 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 6, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-109359 [https://perma.cc/ZB5Q-Y6US].
160. Lalmahomed v. Netherlands, App. No. 26036/08, ¶ 7 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2011), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103598 [https://perma.cc/ZM7D-UB9K].
161. Id. ¶ 8.
162. Id. ¶ 11.
163. Id. ¶ 13.
164. Id. ¶ 26.
165. Id. ¶ 29.
166. Id. ¶ 46.
167. Id. ¶ 47.
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unresolved. For example, it is uncertain if the ECtHR would reach a similar
result in cases in which a defendant seeks to introduce fresh evidence of
innocence obtained after a first-instance conviction.168
The uncertainty of whether the right to appeal automatically extends to
separate collateral proceedings challenging a conviction on grounds of
factual innocence is shown by a recent decision of the UNHRC. In Litvin v.
Ukraine, the applicant’s son was convicted of murder and rape.169 The trial
court and the Ukrainian Supreme Court dismissed the defendant’s
allegations that he had been tortured into confessing and was deprived of the
right to gather evidence to refute the prosecution’s case.170 After an appellate
court affirmed the conviction, the defendant retained several forensic experts
whose reports cast doubt on his identity as the assailant, questioned whether
the victim had been raped, and supported his allegations of torture.171 The
defendant then filed a petition with the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office,
relying on provisions of the Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code which
authorize the reopening of criminal cases based on “newly discovered
facts.”172 The office refused to open an investigation, and the Supreme Court
later rejected the defendant’s application to review his conviction, finding no
grounds to reconsider the case.173
In her petition to the UNHRC, the defendant’s mother raised numerous
violations of the ICCPR. The UNHRC agreed with the complaints
concerning her son’s interrogation and the procedural errors, but it dismissed
the alleged violation of the right to appeal:
As to the author’s claim that the refusal of the General Prosecutor to
reconsider the criminal case of her son based on newly discovered facts
after the Supreme Court decided the cassation appeal amounts to a
violation of article 14, paragraph 5, of the [ICCPR guaranteeing the right
to appeal], the Committee considers that the scope of article 14, paragraph
5 does not extend to a review of a conviction and sentence based on newly
discovered facts once this sentence has become final.174

The Litvin decision has been cited for the proposition that the right to
appeal “confers no right to a review of one’s conviction in the light of fresh
168. Such review is common in countries in which appellate courts reexamine both the facts and
the legal issues relating to a prosecution and make de novo determinations of guilt or innocence. See
Marshall, supra note 14, at 22–24 (summarizing de novo appellate review in France, Germany, and Italy).
169. Litvin v. Ukraine, CCPR/C/102/D/1535/2006, Communication No. 1535/2006, ¶ 2.7 (U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm. July 29, 2011).
170. Id. ¶ 2.8–2.9.
171. Id. ¶¶ 2.19–2.20.
172. Id. ¶ 2.22.
173. Id. ¶¶ 2.22–2.23.
174. Id. ¶ 9.4.
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evidence,”175 highlighting a key protection gap in the existing interpretation
of the ICCPR. However, the persuasiveness of this interpretation of Article
14(5) is open to question, not least because it is in tension with the body’s
own subsequent statement that governments—at least in capital cases—
should “re-examine past convictions on the basis of new evidence, including
new DNA evidence.”176
3. The Right to a Remedy
The right to appeal to correct errors of the criminal process is a specific
application of a general international law principle: everyone whose rights
have been violated is entitled to a remedy. In practice, the right to a remedy
supports recognizing a derivative right of defendants to assert claims of
factual innocence, although international law has yet to identify the full
scope of protections associated with such a right.
The right to a remedy is expressly guaranteed by the UDHR177 and by
most global and regional human rights treaties,178 and it has been reaffirmed
and amplified in soft law, including a 2005 U.N. General Assembly
Resolution.179 In general, a remedy should be “full and effective” and
“proportional to the gravity of the violation” and of the injury suffered.180
Remedial measures should include, whenever possible, restoring the
situation that existed before the violation occurred.181
In the criminal context, “often the most appropriate” remedy for a fair
trial right violation not corrected on appeal is a retrial or reopening of the
proceedings.182 Nearly all European countries, for example, have established
mechanisms to reopen domestic criminal proceedings following an ECtHR
175. See JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 155, at 515.
176. General Comment No. 36, supra note 143, ¶ 43.
177. See UDHR, supra note 150, art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the
competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or
by law.”).
178. ICCPR Article 2.3(a) requires States parties “[t]o ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” ICCPR, supra note 141, art.
2.3(a). ECHR Article 13 contains essentially identical language. See ECHR, supra note 141, art. 13.
Article 2.3(b) of the ICCPR further specifies that remedies must be provided by the “competent judicial,
administrative[,] . . . legislative . . . , or . . . other competent authority” in the state’s legal system, with a
preference for judicial remedies. ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 2.3(b).
179. See G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines].
180. Id. ¶ 18.
181. Id. ¶ 19.
182. See Ferreira v. Portugal (No. 2), App. No. 19867/12, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber July
11, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175646 [https://perma.cc/47M8-DT3C].
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judgment finding a prosecution or conviction in violation of the ECHR.183
However, states have also provided restitution in criminal cases by reducing
or suspending enforcement of a sentence, unconditionally releasing a
defendant, and providing compensation.184
The right to remedy has been interpreted to require reopening of
criminal proceedings in response to legal innocence claims. A recent
UNHRC decision, Saidov v. Tajikistan, is illustrative. The case concerned a
former government official convicted of illegally forming an opposition
political party.185 The proceedings involved numerous violations of pretrial
and fair trial rights, including the courts’ refusal to consider evidence of
Saidov’s innocence.186 The UNHRC concluded that the obligation to make
“full reparation” for these violations required the state, “inter alia, to (a)
quash Mr. Saidov’s conviction, release him and, if necessary, conduct a new
trial, in accordance with the principles of fair hearings, presumption of
innocence and other procedural safeguards; and (b) provide Mr. Saidov with
adequate compensation.”187
Additional support for reopening criminal proceedings is found in
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, which codifies the double jeopardy,
or ne bis in idem, principle.188 The first paragraph of Article 4 defines the
scope of the right not to be tried or punished twice.189 The second paragraph
provides an exception that permits the reopening of a case “if there is
evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental
defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the
case.”190 The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 clarifies that this
exception “does not prevent a reopening of the proceedings in favour of the
convicted person and any other changing of the judgment to the benefit of
183. See id. ¶¶ 34–39; see also Alice Donald & Anne-Katrin Speck, The European Court of Human
Rights’ Remedial Practice and Its Impact on the Execution of Judgments, 19 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 83, 94
(2019) (discussing ECtHR jurisprudence “concerning the re-opening of criminal proceedings following
an unfair trial”).
184. IVANA ROAGNA, FLORIAN BALLHYSA & BLERINA BULICA, COUNCIL OF EUR., THE RIGHT TO
A FAIR TRIAL AND RE-OPENING OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: TRAINING MANUAL ON ARTICLE 6 ECHR
19 (2017).
185. See Saidov v. Tajikistan, CCPR/C/122/D/2680/2015, Communication No. 2680/2015, ¶¶ 9.2–
9.7 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Sept. 20, 2018).
186. See id. ¶¶ 2.7–2.8.
187. Id. ¶ 11. These remedies are consistent with those the Committee has indicated in other cases
involving criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Mukhtar v. Kazakhstan, CCPR/C/115/D/2304/2013,
Communication No. 2304/2013, ¶ 9 (U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. Dec. 9, 2015); U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
Guidelines on Measures of Reparation Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/158 (Nov. 30, 2016).
188. See Protocol No. 7, supra note 158, art. 4.
189. See id. art. 4 § 1.
190. See id. art. 4 § 2.
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the convicted person.”191
In Mihalache v. Romania, the ECtHR considered in dictum whether the
exception applies to “situations where an accused has been found guilty and
a reopening of proceedings might work to his advantage.”192 Citing the
Explanatory Report, the Court asserted that “the nature of the defect must be
assessed primarily in order to ascertain whether there has been a violation of
the defence rights and therefore an impediment to the proper administration
of justice.”193
Taken together, the Saidov and Mihalache decisions underscore
international law’s focus on the procedural violations that provide the basis
for legal innocence claims. While these cases do not explicitly address postconviction claims of factual innocence, the core principles underlying the
right to a remedy also provide a strong foundation for affording individuals
who raise claims of factual innocence a meaningful opportunity to assert
those claims in a domestic proceeding that can grant appropriate relief—
including by reopening criminal convictions—if the claim is upheld.
4. The Right to Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice
International law provides another remedy for human rights violations
in criminal proceedings: the right to compensation for miscarriages of
justice. This provision appears in the ICCPR and in regional human rights
treaties, which we analyze infra. Yet international law has lagged on
specifying how this right applies to factual innocence claims—in particular,
by not expressly requiring states to establish procedures for defendants to
raise wrongful conviction claims and to determine whether miscarriages of
justice have occurred. However, recent developments suggest a move toward
recognizing a right to raise both legal and factual post-conviction innocence
claims as part of the right to compensation.
The foundational provision recognizing a right to compensation appears
in Article 14(6) of the ICCPR, which provides as follows:
When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence
and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been
pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows
conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who
has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be
191. Council of Eur., Explanatory Report to the Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 117, ¶ 31 (Nov. 22, 1984) [hereinafter Explanatory
Report].
192. Mihalache v. Romania, App. No. 54012/10, ¶ 133 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 8, 2019), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-194523 [https://perma.cc/HAT9-D2L9].
193. Id.
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compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure
of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.194

Similar provisions appear in two regional human rights treaties. Article
3 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, adopted in 1984, follows the same wording
as ICCPR Article 14(6), except that compensation shall be awarded either
“according to the law or the practice of the State concerned.”195 Article 10
of the American Convention on Human Rights contains a more succinct
articulation: “Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance
with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a final judgment through
a miscarriage of justice.”196 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights lacks a corresponding provision. However, the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has adopted nonbinding principles and
guidelines that closely track the right to compensation as set forth in the
ICCPR.197
The drafting history sheds some light on the scope of this compensation
right. Article 14(6) has been labeled as “at the time of its drafting, the most
controversial provision” among the ICCPR’s fair trial rights.198 Summing up
the competing views, the U.N. Secretary-General noted: “It was
argued . . . that the payment of compensation was a matter for the exclusive
discretion of the executive and that national approaches varied considerably;
[conversely,] that the right to compensation . . . was basic and should be
made enforceable against the State . . . .”199 One reason for this controversy
was a significant disagreement among states as to whether a “miscarriage of
justice” requires a showing of factual innocence or can be demonstrated by
other fair trial violations.200
194. ICCPR, supra note 141, art.14(6). A few ICCPR State parties, mostly in the Global South,
have filed reservations to Article 14(6). The reservations accept the right to compensation in principle but
assert that it was not possible to implement the provision at the time of ratifying the ICCPR. See Mujuzi,
supra note 14, at 216 n.2.
195. Protocol No. 7, supra note 158, art. 3.
196. American Convention on Human Rights art. 10, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
197. Principle 10(2)(b) of the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal
Assistance in Africa (2003) is “a verbatim reproduction of Article 14(6) of the ICCPR except that it is
silent on the issue of whether such a person would also qualify for compensation even if ‘it is proved that
the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.’ ” Mujuzi, supra
note 14, at 235.
198. MANFRED, NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY 269
(1993).
199. MARC J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 311 (1987).
200. According to one recent study, the fact that delegates twice rejected proposals to condition
compensation upon a finding of actual innocence indicates that the right extends to other types of
miscarriages of justice. See Mujuzi, supra note 14, at 221. However, the basic normative disagreements
among states over whether to include this right in the ICCPR makes it difficult to draw any firm
conclusions.
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The Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 7 is similarly ambiguous,
underscoring the difficulty of protecting the right to claim factual innocence
via the right to compensation for miscarriages of justice. The report initially
describes a miscarriage of justice as “some serious failure in the judicial
process involving grave prejudice to the convicted person.”201 Even so, it
later asserts that compensation is required “only in clear cases of miscarriage
of justice, in the sense that there would be acknowledgement that the person
concerned was clearly innocent,” in contrast to an “appellate[] court [that]
had quashed a conviction because it had discovered some fact which
introduced a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and which had
been overlooked by the trial judge.”202
The UNHRC and ECtHR have interpreted the meaning of “miscarriage
of justice” in two decisions. In Dumont v. Canada, the applicant was
convicted of rape based primarily on the victim’s testimony.203 The victim
changed her statement after the trial, claiming that she had misidentified the
perpetrator.204 The revised statement was not considered on appeal, but a
court later quashed the applicant’s conviction following a review by a board
of inquiry.205
Dumont then filed a petition pursuant to the Guidelines on
Compensation for Wrongfully Convicted and Imprisoned Persons, which
authorize the Canadian government to award compensation to an exonerated
defendant if “a new fact [has] come to light that shows that a miscarriage of
justice has taken place.”206 According to the Guidelines, “compensation
should only be granted to those persons who did not commit the crime for
which they were convicted.”207 Applying this standard, the government
denied the petition and Dumont challenged the denial in court.208 After
proceedings relating to the compensation claim remained unresolved for
several years, Dumont filed a complaint with the UNHRC.209
The UNHRC held that Canada had violated Article 14(6) together with
Article 2(3) of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right to an effective
remedy.210 The principal basis for this conclusion was the lack of a
201. Explanatory Report, supra note 191, ¶ 23.
202. Id. ¶ 25.
203. Dumont v. Canada, CCPR/C/98/D/1467/2006, Communication No. 1467/2006, ¶ 2.1 (U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm. May 21, 2010).
204. Id.
205. Id. ¶ 13.2.
206. Id. ¶ 3.1.
207. Id. ¶ 16.1 n.10.
208. Id. ¶ 3.2.
209. Id. ¶ 13.4.
210. Id. ¶ 23.6. Article 2(3) requires states to provide a remedy for violations of the ICCPR. ICCPR,
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meaningful domestic mechanism for Dumont, following his acquittal, to
“launch[] a new investigation in order to review the case and to possibly
identify the real perpetrator.”211 As a result of this “gap” in the law—as well
as the multi-year delay in the subsequent civil proceedings—Canada had
deprived Dumont of “an effective remedy to enable him to establish his
innocence . . . in order to obtain the compensation provided for in article 14,
paragraph 6.”212
The UNHRC also considered what qualifies as a “miscarriage of
justice.”213 Canada argued that no miscarriage had occurred, because the
victim’s revised statement merely cast doubt on Dumont’s conviction but did
not prove that he was actually innocent.214 Since the government had not
created an effective procedure for exonerated defendants to apply for
compensation, the UNHRC did not take a “position on the accuracy of the
State party’s interpretation.”215 One member of the Committee dissented on
this point, concluding that Article 14(6) “does not require the convicted
person to prove his or her innocence.”216 Consistent with that interpretation,
the dissent would have required Canada to revise the Guidelines to “abolish
the obligation for the convicted person to give proof of innocence in order to
receive compensation for a miscarriage of justice.”217
In the European human rights system, the meaning of “miscarriage of
justice” has arisen in cases applying the presumption of innocence in ECHR
Article 6(2). The ECtHR has held that the presumption, in addition to
protecting individuals prior to and during criminal trials, continues after an
acquittal.218 For example, government officials may not make public
statements implying that an individual is guilty of the crime for which she
was acquitted. This includes statements in judicial or administrative
proceedings in which the individual seeks compensation for a miscarriage of
justice.
supra note 141, art. 2(3).
211. Dumont v. Canada, CCPR/C/98/D/1467/2006, Communication No. 1467/2006, ¶ 23.5 (U.N.
Hum. Rts. Comm. May 21, 2010).
212. Id. ¶ 23.6.
213. Id. ¶ 23.4–23.6.
214. Id. ¶ 23.4.
215. Id. ¶ 23.5.
216. Id. app. ¶ 4 (partly dissenting individual opinion by Mr. Fabián Omar Salvioli). Although
Canada relied on the drafting history (discussed supra) to argue that “proof of factual innocence is a
requirement” for compensation, the dissent reasoned that “such an interpretation is incompatible with
both the letter and the spirit of” Article 14(6). Id. app. ¶¶ 7–8.
217. Id. app. ¶ 12.
218. See generally Orr v. Norway, App. No. 31283/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 15, 2008), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-86298 [https://perma.cc/8MTG-5YBZ] (applying article 6(2) to victim’s
claim against a defendant who had been acquitted of a rape charge).
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The ECtHR Grand Chamber addressed the tension between the postacquittal presumption of innocence and the right to compensation in Allen v.
United Kingdom.219 The applicant in Allen was convicted of manslaughter
of her four-year-old son based on medical evidence that the child had died
of non-accidental shaking of the brain, known as Shaken Baby Syndrome.220
However, a post-conviction report revealed that the child’s death may have
been due to other causes.221 The U.K. courts reversed Allen’s conviction but
denied her application for compensation, holding that while the new medical
evidence rendered her conviction “unsafe,” reasonable jurors could differ on
whether she should have been convicted.222
The Grand Chamber concluded that the decision to deny Allen’s
compensation claim did not imply that she should have been convicted and,
therefore, did not violate the presumption of innocence.223 In reaching this
result, the ECtHR briefly considered the right to compensation for
miscarriages of justice.224 The United Kingdom has not ratified Protocol No.
7, and thus the Grand Chamber could not directly interpret the right to
compensation protected by Article 3 of that Protocol. However, the Court
made two statements relevant to that provision. The first recognized that
domestic courts have discretion “to interpret the legislation [giving effect to
the compensation right and] . . . to conclude that more than an acquittal was
required in order for a ‘miscarriage of justice’ to be established.”225 Second,
the Grand Chamber remarked that the narrow view of Article 3 suggested in
the Protocol’s Explanatory Report—that proof of factual innocence is
necessary to claim compensation—“must now be considered to have been
overtaken by the Court’s intervening case-law on Article 6 § 2.”226 This
dictum suggests that, in a future case, the ECtHR may adopt the view of the
dissenting member of the UNHRC in Dumont—that the right to
compensation for miscarriages of justice applies to egregious violations of
fair trial rights as well as to claims of factual innocence.
219. See generally Allen v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25424/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber
July 12, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122859 [https://perma.cc/H2CM-TZRM].
220. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
221. Id. ¶ 13; see Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and
the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 18 (2009).
222. Allen v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25424/09, ¶¶ 13–42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber July
12, 2013), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122859 [https://perma.cc/H2CM-TZRM].
223. Id. ¶ 134.
224. Id. ¶¶ 129–33.
225. Id. ¶ 129. The United Kingdom, which is a party to the ICCPR, has adopted legislation to
implement Article 14(6) and provide a mechanism for compensating defendants who have been
wrongfully convicted. See Criminal Justice Act 1988, c. 33, § 133 (UK).
226. Allen v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25424/09, ¶ 133 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber July 12,
2013, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122859 [https://perma.cc/H2CM-TZRM].
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5. Summing Up the Derivative Rights Approach
International human rights law is deeply concerned with ensuring a fair
criminal process, and it includes an extensive list of guarantees relating to
that process. A clear, explicit, and comprehensive right to assert postconviction claims of factual innocence is, nonetheless, missing from these
guarantees.227 This Section has shown that the recent case law of
international human rights bodies provides a strong basis for deriving such a
right from closely related treaty provisions, including the rights to life, to a
fair trial and appeal, to a remedy, and to compensation for miscarriages of
justice. The UNHRC’s decision in Dumont v. Canada comes closest to
recognizing the right to claim innocence through a purposive interpretation
of the latter two treaty provisions.
The derivative rights approach is not, however, the only way to close
international law’s innocence gap. As we now explain, a strong argument
can also be made that the right to claim innocence satisfies the criteria for
assessing whether to recognize a new, freestanding human right.
D. THE RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE AS A FREESTANDING RIGHT
Although there is no single standard for recognition of a new human
right, several common elements can be identified.228 In brief, these criteria
227. International criminal tribunals provide procedures to review judgements based on newly
discovered facts, but they do not recognize a right to assert post-conviction claims of factual innocence.
See Int’l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 120, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/Rev/1 (May 13, 2015), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/150513-rpe-enfr.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3VD-TG8Y] (permitting either the defense or the prosecutor to file a motion
for review of judgment when there is a newly discovered fact that was not known at the time of the
proceeding that “could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence); United Nations,
Int’l Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Int’l Humanitarian L.
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule
119, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.50 (July 8, 2015), https://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_
procedure_evidence/IT032Rev50_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5Z3-W2JV] (same). The International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals authorizes the same procedure, and, in addition, requires the
moving party to show that the new fact “could have been a decisive factor in reaching the decision.”
United Nations, International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 146 (May 13, 2015), https://www.irmct.org/sites/default/files/documents/MICT-1-Rev7-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/A456-A7GN]. The Rome Statute also permits a convicted person or related
persons to apply to the Appeals Chamber for a revision of a conviction or sentence, inter alia, when there
is new evidence discovered that was not available at the time of the trial, the unavailability is not
attributable to the moving party, and the evidence is “sufficiently important” that if it had been proved at
trial, it would have resulted in a different verdict. Int’l Crim. Ct., Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Art. 84, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/
add16852-aee9-4757-abe7-9cdc7cf02886/283503/romestatuteng1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EPK-KQ92];
see Int’l Crim. Ct., Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 159, ICC-PIDS-LT-02-002/13 (2013),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/pids/legal-texts/rulesprocedureevidenceeng.pdf [https://perma.cc/FFK37WWZ] (laying out the procedures for filing an application for revision under Article 84 of the Rome
Statute).
228. These criteria seek to “balance dynamism” in human rights protection against the risks of
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require that a new right be consistent with existing rights, fundamental,
precise, and enforceable, and broadly supported by states and other actors in
the international community.229 We explore the contours of the right to claim
innocence in light of these standards.
First, a new right should be “consistent with the existing body of
international . . . law”230 and “compatible with the theoretical foundations of
human rights.”231 However, it should also “not merely [be] repetitive of[] the
existing body of international human rights law”232 but instead be
“independently justifiable” because it fills a gap in existing norms.233
We have previously discussed how a new right to claim innocence
aligns with existing criminal process guarantees. But such a right would
extend beyond the currently identified scope of these guarantees. In
particular, it would clarify (and, in some instances, require) the mechanisms
needed to provide meaningful redress for legal innocence claims and extend
those mechanisms to factual innocence claims in all cases—for example, not
just when a factual innocence claim is part of the trial record. This close
nexus satisfies the first criterion of consistency.
A second requirement is that a new stand-alone right must be
“fundamental.”234 This has been variously described as requiring the right to
be of “great importance for human beings,”235 to “demonstrate universal
undue proliferation. Bridget Lewis, Quality Control for New Rights in International Human Rights Law:
A Case Study of the Right to a Good Environment, 33 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 55, 57–60 (2015).
229. The U.N. General Assembly adopted a standard for recognizing new human rights in 1986.
See G.A. Res. 41/120, ¶ 4 (Dec. 4, 1986) (stating that “international instruments in the field of human
rights . . . should . . . (a) Be consistent with the existing body of international human rights law; (b) Be of
fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person; (c) Be
sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and practicable rights and obligations; (d) Provide, where
appropriate, realistic and effective implementation machinery, including reporting systems; [and] (e)
Attract broad international support”). For other approaches to developing criteria for recognizing new
rights, see Lewis, supra note 228, at 60–79; B.G. Ramcharan, The Concept of Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 1983 CAN. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 267; Alston, supra note 139, at 615; James
W. Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: Philosophical Perspectives on Its Scope and
Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281, 288 (1993); BRIDGET LEWIS, ENVIRONMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 95–148 (2018).
230. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 229, ¶ 4(a).
231. Lewis, supra note 228, at 60–71 (identifying this as one of five criteria for recognizing new
rights, alongside the new right being “independently justifiable,” being precise, specifying rights-holders
and duty-bearers, and being politically supported).
232. Alston, supra note 139, at 615.
233. Lewis, supra note 228, at 60–62; see also Çalı, supra note 120, at 278 (warning that new rights
may face skepticism if they “do[] not add any new value to already existing rights”).
234. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 229, ¶ 4(b).
235. See Eva Brems, Birthing New Human Rights: Reflections Around a Hypothetical Human Right
of Access to Gestational Surrogacy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS:
RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 326, 329 (emphasis omitted).
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importance,”236 to “reflect a fundamentally important social value,”237 and
to “be relevant, inevitably to varying degrees, throughout a world of diverse
value systems.”238 An emphasis on the fundamental nature of the new right
can also assuage concerns that a right is not sufficiently universal239 or that
it “creates undue burdens” of implementation.240
As reviewed in Part I, remedies for wrongful convictions serve the most
basic purpose of any criminal legal system: to ensure that individuals who
have not committed an offense are not convicted and punished. The right to
claim innocence has been recognized as an exception to finality at the
national level precisely because it supports this fundamental principle.
A third substantive requirement is precision.241 This encompasses
precision in normative content so that the right “give[s] rise to identifiable
rights and obligations.”242 It also includes precision in “identifying rightsholders and duty-bearers.”243 To satisfy this criterion, in Part III we identify
with granularity the core elements of an express right to claim innocence and
discuss the different institutions and actors that can help to realize this right.
Precision is also linked to concerns about ensuring that a new right is
feasible and enforceable,244 including “through realistic and effective
implementation machinery.”245 With respect to the right to claim innocence,
this fourth criterion can be satisfied by giving individuals access to treaty
bodies, regional courts, and other institutions that already adjudicate claims
alleging violations of the rights to life, fair trial, appeal, remedy, and
compensation. In Part III, we further explain how the right can be tailored to
the three national models for remedying wrongful convictions.
Finally, a new, freestanding right should have “support”246—which has
been variously described as encompassing “[s]ufficient [p]olitical
[s]upport,”247 “broad international support,”248 acceptance by “states and
236. Çalı, supra note 120, at 278.
237. Alston, supra note 229, at 615.
238. Id.
239. See Brems, supra note 235, at 329 (“[I]t is widely understood that human rights should protect
interests that are of great importance for human beings (threshold criterion) and that are universally valid
(universality criterion).”).
240. See Çalı, supra note 120, at 278.
241. See G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 229, ¶ 4(c).
242. Alston, supra note 139, at 615; see also Lewis, supra note 228, at 71–75 (arguing that a right
“must be capable of definition precise enough to enable it to be attainable and capable of enforcement”).
243. Lewis, supra note 228, at 75–77.
244. See Çalı, supra note 120, at 280; Lewis, supra note 228, at 71.
245. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 229, ¶ 4(d).
246. Id. ¶ 4(e).
247. Lewis, supra note 228, 77–79.
248. G.A. Res. 41/120, supra note 229, ¶ 4(e).
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international bodies,”249 and compatibility “with the general practice of
states.”250 Significantly, the right to claim innocence does not introduce a
new protected population, subject, or field to international law. Nor is it a
right that is unprotected at the national level; as we have shown, countries
with very different legal and political systems have adopted remedies in this
area, albeit with gaps that international human rights law can help to fill and
harmonize.
Importantly, we do not argue that a stand-alone right to claim innocence
has been recognized by the United Nations or by other international bodies.
We have rather sought to identify concrete gaps that the new right would fill.
This approach is consistent with the view of scholars that a claim or demand
which has yet to receive formal legal recognition at the international level
can nevertheless be justified as a new, separate right.251
E. PROS AND CONS OF DERIVATIVE VS. FREESTANDING APPROACHES
In practice, identifying—and garnering support for—a new human right
requires more than a mechanical application of substantive standards. In this
Section we consider additional factors that may inform whether a right to
claim innocence should be recognized as a derivative or a stand-alone right
in international law. In particular, we compare the advantages and
disadvantages of each pathway to recognition across three elements:
feasibility, protection, and resources. In Part III, we consider a related
question—how a new right to claim innocence fares under critiques
sounding in so-called rights inflation.
Deriving new rights, such as the right to claim innocence, from existing
ones is often a path of lesser resistance. It reflects a cautious and “[]less
ambitious[] approach,”252 but one with an immediate payoff—namely, that
“the new right will be part of lex lata instantly,”253 since there is no
requirement for states to separately accept the norm.254 Conversely, insisting
249. Bob, supra note 117, at 4.
250. Alston, supra note 139, at 615.
251. See Susi, supra note 92, at 28 (“Even if it has not yet established itself as a self-standing right,
we can still speak of a new human right, and can add the qualification ‘under the process of
contestation.’ ”); see also Alston, supra note 139, at 615 (noting that the right should “be eligible for
recognition on the grounds that it is an interpretation of UN Charter obligations, a reflection of customary
law rules or a formulation that is declaratory of general principles of law”); von der Decken & Koch,
supra note 122, at 20 (noting that the desirability of new rights being necessary and being “firmly
grounded in law” should be constantly weighed against an understanding that human rights themselves
require an “inherent dynamism”).
252. Thielbörger, supra note 121, at 73.
253. von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 19.
254. See Tiina Pajuste, The Status of the Human Rights of Older Persons, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 183, 187.
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that a very new right exists may backfire and undermine progress toward
recognizing the right.255 Acceptance under the derivative rights approach is
also aided by the normative determinacy that often comes with relying on
established legal guarantees.256
Derivative approaches can also enhance protection by emphasizing
human rights as “indivisible and interdependent.”257 Extending existing
rights to the wrongfully convicted through a derivative approach “is
conceptually compatible with the idea that all persons are equal and have
equal rights.”258 Deriving the right to claim innocence from existing rights
also avoids wasted resources, since it can be difficult to justify expending
political capital on developing a whole new framework when it is possible
to interpret existing protections to secure the right.259
As for the stand-alone pathway, the feasibility concerns that often arise
with new, freestanding rights are notably less pronounced for the right to
claim innocence. Somewhat unusually, as shown in Part I, national practice
on the right is more advanced than international recognition. As a result,
barriers that might otherwise deter governments from accepting a new,
freestanding right may be lower, since international law recognition can help
clarify legal obligations260 and “enhance the profile of [a] right” that many
states have already accepted.261
As for the protection element, the derivative approach, while useful for
emphasizing interdependence of existing rights guarantees, may leave gaps
and inconsistent approaches.262 A derived right to claim innocence is
necessarily limited by the contours of the “parent” right(s),263 with the risk
that it may be viewed as “ancillary” or subordinate to other criminal process
guarantees, such as the right to an appeal.264 A stand-alone right, in contrast,
255. See Lau, supra note 123, at 206.
256. See Luis E. Rodríguez-Rivera, The Right to Environment: A New, Internationally Recognised,
Human Right, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY,
RHETORIC, supra note 92, at 153, 154 (listing reasons that a stand-alone right might not be recognized,
including that it has an “inherent indeterminacy,” has a “redundancy effect,” is “non-justiciable and nonenforceable,” or would “devalue or debase the human rights currency”).
257. Jérémie Gilbert, The Human Right to Land: ‘New Right’ or ‘Old Wine in a New Bottle’?, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra note
92, at 97, 101.
258. Pajuste, supra note 254, at 188.
259. See Rodríguez-Rivera, supra note 256, at 154.
260. See Pajuste, supra note 254, at 187.
261. Chirwa, supra note 121, at 59.
262. See Pajuste, supra note 254, at 186.
263. See von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13.
264. See Gilbert, supra note 257, at 101.
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“would prevent cases and situations falling through the cracks and holes”265
and underscore the right’s overall importance.
Lastly, using political and social resources to recognize a freestanding
right to claim innocence may have the salutary effect of highlighting the
achievements of the transnational innocence movement. Framing a new right
in derivative terms risks obscuring these origin stories, including how civil
society groups have pushed for recognition in diverse national and
international settings.266 Seen from this perspective, framing the right to
claim innocence as a separate right also has a strong communicative effect,
signaling to rights-holders “that they can count on [the] protection”267 of
international law.
III. CLOSING INTERNATIONAL LAW’S INNOCENCE GAP
We have thus far shown that international human rights law has an
important, surprising, and remediable gap: the absence of an explicit and
fully articulated right of defendants to raise wrongful conviction claims
based on newly acquired evidence of factual innocence. This gap is
important because an obligatory mechanism for raising innocence claims is
closely linked to—and consistent with the values underlying—core human
rights guarantees relating to the criminal process. The gap is surprising
because a growing number of national jurisdictions have created such
mechanisms, but in diverse ways and with only limited input from human
rights treaties. The gap is also remediable, since recognizing such a right
would be consistent with the two principal ways that other “new” human
rights have been accepted in international law.
In this Part, we turn from analysis to prescription, exploring the
substantive content of an international right to claim innocence. We argue
that the right should be articulated in general terms that define its core
elements while preserving sufficient flexibility for states to adapt it to their
criminal laws and to the diverse national models for raising innocence claims
described in Part I.
We begin by offering a draft text of the right to claim innocence and
explain how the text is situated in relation to other criminal process
guarantees. We then discuss several issues relating to the international
definition of the right, as well as national-level considerations. We conclude
265. Stefan Martini, Strong New Branches to the Trunk: Realising the Right to Health Decentrally,
in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, RHETORIC, supra
note 92, at 124, 133.
266. See Susi, supra note 92, at 23.
267. Martini, supra note 265, at 132.
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by considering and rejecting a potential objection to our proposal—that
human rights are overly inflated and should not be further expanded.
A. DRAFT TEXT OF A NEW RIGHT TO CLAIM INNOCENCE
The text of an international right to claim innocence could be drafted
concisely as follows:
After a person has, by a final decision, been convicted of a criminal
offense, the person shall have the right to seek relief from that conviction,
including on the ground that newly discovered evidence of innocence
shows that the conviction lacks factual support.

As articulated, the right complements and fits neatly alongside existing
criminal process protections. Article 14 of the ICCPR provides a helpful
illustration. As previously explained, Article 14(5) provides that a person
“shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a
higher tribunal according to law”; Article 14(6) requires that compensation
be provided to an individual who has suffered “a miscarriage of justice”; and
Article 14(7) prohibits a person who has been convicted or acquitted of a
crime from being “tried or punished again” for the same offense.268 The text
set forth supra would augment this list of key criminal justice guarantees.
The text also leaves open the possibility of creating procedures to review
post-conviction claims of legal innocence, such as violations of fair trial
rights, as well as other procedural errors.
We emphasize, however, that we are not proposing an amendment to
the ICCPR or any other human rights treaty. On the contrary, we expect that
the right to claim innocence will appear, at least initially, in guidelines,
declarations, and other soft law standards promulgated by treaty monitoring
bodies, U.N. special procedures, and other international and regional
institutions, with input from human rights nongovernmental organizations,
national innocence projects, and experts in international and criminal law.269
Nonetheless, these documents, no less than binding treaty provisions, must
describe the content of the right with precision to encourage governments to
implement it in domestic law.270
268. ICCPR, supra note 141, art.14(5)–(7).
269. A recent example of protecting a new right through soft law is the effort to have the U.N.
Human Rights Council recognize the right to a healthy environment. See, e.g., THE TIME IS NOW!
GLOBAL CALL FOR THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL TO URGENTLY RECOGNISE THE RIGHT TO A SAFE,
CLEAN, HEALTHY AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 4 (Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.ciel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Global-Call-for-the-UN-to-Recognize-the-Right-to-a-Healthy-EnvironmentEnglish.pdf [https://perma.cc/PR25-MW3Q] (urging all states to support resolutions recognizing “the
right to a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment”).
270. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 386–88,
391–94 (1999) (proposing texts of admissibility clauses to regulate forum shopping among global and
regional human rights bodies while noting that treaty amendments would be unlikely and identifying
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B. DEFINING THE RIGHT
The core of the right is a legal entitlement to access, and to receive
appropriate redress from, a domestic mechanism that reviews claims based
on evidence of innocence obtained after a final conviction. Such a
mechanism should satisfy the procedural and substantive components of the
right to a remedy.271 In particular, the mechanism must have the capacity to
review innocence claims on the merits and the authority to provide full and
meaningful reparation, including compensation and the possibility of
nullifying convictions.272 In addition, the mechanism must be
nondiscriminatory in terms of both the procedures governing access and the
substantive outcomes it produces.
These considerations inform our discussion of several definitional
issues raised by the draft text we have proposed. A preliminary issue
concerns the meaning of the phrase “final decision.” In many instances, such
decisions will be made following a criminal trial. However, it is important
that the right not be limited to trials. In the United States, for example, the
bulk of criminal cases are plea bargained. For the right to be effective, all
negotiated or summary determinations of guilt should be eligible for
subsequent innocence review.273
A second definitional question is when evidence is “newly discovered.”
This term does not require that evidence be wholly different from that
presented during the original criminal proceeding. It is not limited to a “new
or newly discovered fact”274 and includes new technology, testing, or
scientific research applied to evidence introduced at trial.275
alternative ways to implement reforms).
271. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 179, ¶ 12 (“A victim of a gross violation
of international human rights law . . . shall have equal access to an effective judicial remedy as provided
for under international law.”); Pablo de Greiff (Special Rapporteur), Report of the Special Rapporteur for
the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/36/50 (Aug. 21, 2017) (emphasizing access “to a meaningful criminal justice system with the
prompt exercise of judicial power within a reasonable amount of time”); see also CLOONEY & WEBB,
supra note 14, at 831–900 (extensively reviewing the remedies that international law requires for
violations of fair trial rights).
272. See, e.g., Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 3 (2012): Implementation of Article
14 by States Parties, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/3 (Dec. 13, 2012).
273. For a discussion of this issue in the United States, see Colin Miller, Why States Must Consider
Innocence Claims After Guilty Pleas, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 671, 727 (2020); Stephens, supra note 44,
at 320–23.
274. In this respect, the proposed right to claim innocence goes beyond the right to compensation
for a miscarriage of justice, which applies if a conviction has been overturned as a result of “a new or
newly discovered fact.” See ICCPR, supra note 141, art. 14(6).
275. For example, in the prosecution discussed in Allen v. United Kingdom, newly contested
medical evidence concerning shaken baby syndrome was found not to constitute new facts. Such evidence
was nevertheless considered under the United Kingdom’s post-conviction review mechanism. Allen v.
Kingdom, App. No. 25424/09, ¶¶ 15–17 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber July 12, 2013),
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The phrase “newly discovered” also raises the question of whether
national jurisdictions can disregard post-conviction evidence of innocence
whose nondiscovery can be attributed to the defendant or to his or her
counsel. The treaty-based right to compensation for miscarriages of justice
includes such a limitation but places the burden of proof on the
government.276 A similar requirement is appropriate for the proposed right
to claim innocence. However, courts and other review bodies should be
mindful of the fact that true “equality of arms”277 in domestic criminal law
systems is often illusory and that attribution to a defendant should be proven,
not inferred.
A third definitional issue concerns the term “innocence.” Our focus on
factual innocence suggests that the right must apply, at a minimum, in two
situations—when evidence is presented that the wrong person was convicted
or that no crime occurred at all. The draft text we propose is more openended, however. It adds the word “including” to underscore that the right can
also apply to violations of procedural and other fair trial guarantees that
provide the basis for legal innocence claims.
Our proposed text intentionally eschews the phrase “miscarriage of
justice.” Section II.C described the unsettled meaning of this phrase in
international human rights law. National practice reveals a similar lack of
clarity. “Miscarriage of justice” has been used to refer to incorrect criminal
verdicts and to an array of grounds that permit plain error review or excuse
other procedural barriers to an appeal or post-conviction relief.278 Scholars
have similarly proposed a range of broad definitions of the phrase that
include both procedural and innocence-related errors in criminal cases.279
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?
i=001-122859 [https://perma.cc/H2CM-TZRM]. Similarly, in the United States, six states have enacted
new post-conviction statutes that expressly authorize relief based on new scientific developments. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-582 (West 2018); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 6.502(G)(2) (West 2021); NEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.900–34.990 (West 2019); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(b) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-403 (2021).
276. See ICCPR, supra note 141, art.14(6) (denying compensation for miscarriages of justice where
“it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to” the
defendant).
277. OMKAR SIDHU, THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY OF ARMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER
ARTICLE 6 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2017).
278. For examples of U.S. courts using the phrase, largely in the plain error context, see, for
example, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 393 (2013) (permitting petitioners who can make a
“miscarriage of justice” showing to overcome the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations); United States
v. Buchanan, 933 F.3d 501, 509 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that reversal based on a plain error is appropriate
only if “jury instructions [are] so clearly erroneous as to likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice”);
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 632 N.E.2d 821, 825–27 (Mass. 1994) (holding that the standard for review for
post-appeal motion for a new trial is “substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice”).
279. An apt example appears in the following definition:
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In the draft text supra, the word “innocence” is qualified by the phrase
“shows that the conviction lacks support.” This recognizes that “innocence”
does not have a legal meaning in most jurisdictions; instead, courts
considering innocence claims assess whether a conviction cannot be
sustained in light of the new evidence presented.280 We anticipate that
national judges will operationalize the “lacks support” standard in light of
various factors, such as the elements of the crime in question, the evidence
introduced at trial, the support offered for a post-conviction claim, and the
standard for reviewing such claims.
Although the “lacks support” standard is flexible enough to allow for
some variation across jurisdictions, the focus must remain on the present—
whether a factfinder would now convict the person in light of the new
evidence provided. This temporal requirement helps to overcome an undue
focus on finality and guilt, in which courts conclude that sufficient evidence
to convict in the past makes it unnecessary to consider any new evidence of
innocence.281
Issues are also likely to arise regarding how persuasive new evidence
of innocence must be to find that a conviction “lacks support.” For example,
many states in the United States apply a “more likely than not” standard to
determine whether a reasonable jury would convict with the benefit of the
new evidence.282 However, other states have adopted “would have changed
the outcome” standards283 or “clearly convincing” standards that require
extremely high levels of proof.284 Outside of the United States, review
A miscarriage occurs as follows: whenever suspects or defendants or convicts are treated by
the State in breach of their rights, whether because of, first, deficient processes or, second, the
laws which are applied to them or, third, because there is no factual justification for the applied
treatment or punishment; fourth, whenever suspects or defendants or convicts are treated
adversely by the State to a disproportionate extent in comparison with the need to protect the
rights of others; fifth, whenever the rights of others are not effectively or proportionately
protected or vindicated by State action against wrongdoers, or sixth, by State law itself.
Clive Walker, Miscarriages of Justice in Principle and Practice, in M ISCARRIAGES OF J USTICE : A
R EVIEW OF J USTICE IN E RROR 31, 33 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1999). For a criticism of this
definition as “overbroad and indeterminate,” see Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in
the War Against Terror, 109 P ENN S T . L. R EV . 967, 1036 (2005). For a discussion of practice in the
United Kingdom, see generally Steven Greer, Miscarriages of Criminal Justice Reconsidered, 57 M OD .
L. R EV . 58 (1994).
280. See supra Section I.C.
281. For a canonical account of the perils of this “guilt-based” reasoning in the context of harmless
error review, see Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1167, 1171 (1995).
282. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 330 (1995) (adopting a “more likely than not” standard for
excusing otherwise applicable procedural bars based on new evidence of innocence).
283. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543 (West 2021).
284. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(b) (2015) (providing for post-conviction relief based
on DNA evidence unavailable at trial if it establishes by “clear and convincing evidence” that the
petitioner would not have been convicted by a reasonable trier of fact); see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
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standards range from an “unsafe” conviction standard, a “reasonable
probability” standard, and a “more likely than not” standard to still higher
standards.285
Our proposed text avoids prescribing a single standard of review. Given
the diversity of existing approaches, it is appropriate to allow countries some
discretion to tailor the evaluation of innocence claims to familiar national
practices. We anticipate that some countries may not adopt sufficiently
robust standards and that some judges may interpret standards that are
adequate on paper in ways that make it very difficult to obtain relief.286 We
expect that these problems will be highlighted as national innocence projects
publicize wrongful convictions and exonerations, creating pressure for
additional reforms.
C. ADAPTING THE RIGHT TO NATIONAL MODELS
In addition to the definitional questions just discussed, recognition of
an international right to claim innocence raises important institutional issues.
These include, most notably, which national actors are authorized to review
innocence claims and grant appropriate remedies. As Part I explains,
countries have developed appellate, post-conviction, and administrative
models to carry out such reviews. The right we propose is consistent with all
three models and others that may be developed. In particular, states can
designate courts, administrative bodies, executive branch officials, or some
combination thereof to review innocence claims.
The choice of institution implicates a range of practical considerations.
These include the existence and scope of hearings, whether the right is
protected by due process or other procedural guarantees, whether claimants
can obtain discovery (and from whom), whether claimants have a right to
representation by counsel, and whether the state provides resources for
investigations. We leave these issues to be developed in the future. For
present purposes, we highlight several higher-level considerations relevant
to each of the three national models.
If a country follows the post-conviction model, the right to claim
innocence would be litigated in a collateral proceeding after direct appeals
2953.21(A)(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2021) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-303(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2021)
(same); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (finding that standard for
innocence claim in habeas petition must satisfy clear and convincing evidence standard).
285. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that “extraordinary” or “truly persuasive” proof would
be required to make out a constitutional claim of innocence in a capital post-conviction case. See Herrera
v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
286. See supra Section I.B (discussing examples in which countries modified judicial standards to
make relief more robust or accessible).
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have been exhausted. One advantage of this approach, in terms of receptivity
to innocence claims, is that the jurisdiction has already created procedures to
assert new grounds for relief outside of the trial record after appeals are
complete. Another is that claims can be addressed either to a new judicial
body or to the same judge who presided over the trial.287 One potential
challenge of the post-conviction model is that collateral proceedings are
often narrow or discretionary. This need not be the case, however, and
jurisdictions have broadened post-conviction rules to permit claims based on
newly discovered evidence of innocence.288 States may need to modify these
procedures to ensure that the right satisfies the overarching characteristics
identified supra.
Countries that follow the appellate model place heavy reliance on rules
of finality and often limit claims to evidence presented at trial. Nonetheless,
many appellate model jurisdictions have modified these rules to permit new
evidence to be considered. In civil law countries in particular, reopening a
case to assess new facts does not pose onerous practical or logistical hurdles.
It should thus be relatively straightforward to amend revision processes to
facilitate consideration of new evidence of innocence. In contrast, common
law countries in which there is a right to a jury trial (or hybrid judge and lay
juries) may face greater resistance to allowing the adjudication of new
proceedings.
Countries that adhere to an administrative model authorize a review
commission or similar body to evaluate innocence claims. One advantage of
this approach is that the commission, as an arm of the government, may have
significantly broader ability to access evidence and investigate innocence
claims, including from law enforcement files. These powers are especially
important for pro se and indigent persons in custody, who face great
obstacles in conducting their own investigations. However, in many
countries, the commission or administrative agency ultimately refers cases
to court, with the result that judicial interpretation of the definitional issues
discussed supra will remain essential to the meaningful protection of the
right.
This Section has focused on institutional issues raised by the three
principal national models for reviewing wrongful convictions. We expect,
287. In the United States, several states require post-conviction petitions to be heard by the judge
who conducted the trial or accepted the guilty plea. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(f) (West 2015);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 15-2B-14(e) (West 2019).
288. For recent state statutes permitting challenges based on new scientific evidence, see, for
example, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473 (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-582 (West 2018); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 6.502(G)(2) (West 2021); NEV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.900–34.990 (West 2019); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073(b) (West 2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-403 (West 2021).
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however, that closing international law’s innocence gap will help to promote
convergence across these models and perhaps engender new types of review
mechanisms. We also anticipate that countries which have not created any
mechanism to remedy wrongful convictions will be more likely to do so once
a right is recognized internationally. This provides another justification for
initially articulating the right in soft law instruments, which can be quickly
and easily adapted as countries interpret and apply the right to diverse
national contexts.
D. A REJOINDER TO THE “RIGHTS INFLATION” CRITIQUE
Our review of the two key pathways for recognizing an international
right to claim innocence—and of the opportunities and limits of each
approach—also provides important insights into recent critiques based on
so-called rights inflation. These critiques caution against too readily
recognizing “new” human rights because of concerns variously described as
the proliferation, “bloating,”289 “hypertrophy,”290 “inflation,”291 and
“overproduction”292 of rights. In this Section, we respond to this challenge
by explaining why the right to claim innocence does not implicate these
concerns. We also highlight how consideration of this new right shows that
broader debates over the potential benefits and costs of recognizing “new”
human rights are insufficiently precise.
Opponents of rights inflation raise a series of objections. These include
concerns that expanding international norms undermines “core” human
rights,293 delegitimizes existing guarantees,294 generates ambiguity in the
normative content of rights,295 creates compliance problems by allowing
states to selectively choose which rights to respect,296 and overloads
289. Tasioulas, supra note 118, at 1183.
290. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 143 (2014).
291. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 90 (Amy Gutmann ed.,
2001).
292. See Shaver, supra note 126, at 44.
293. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 291, at 90 (describing “defensible core of rights” as those “strictly
necessary to the enjoyment of any life whatever” and limiting those rights to “civil and political
freedoms”).
294. See POSNER, supra note 290, at 137 (arguing that expansion makes human rights “seem
frivolous and thus throw the enterprise into disrepute”); Ron Dudai, Human Rights in the Populist Era:
Mourn then (Re)Organize, 9 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 16, 18 (2017) (warning of “diluting the human rights
label”).
295. See Dudai, supra note 294, at 18 (stating that protections are “less and less clear and coherent”);
Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights [https://perma.cc/4JEG-HVDP] (highlighting a “huge
number of vaguely defined rights”).
296. See Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279,
280–81 (2017) (describing “fundamental changes” that arose from proliferation, including “mak[ing] it
harder to generate compliance with many norms of international law”).
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international supervisory machinery.297 The proliferation of rights is also
said to mask complex political questions298 in ways that generate “alienation
or resentment,”299 circumvent political debate,300 and create inconsistencies
and conflicts between rights.301 These arguments often focus on economic,
social, and cultural rights,302 but they have been used to discredit the
“positive” aspects of some civil and political rights as well.303
Many of these critiques—such as the concern that international rights
will run roughshod over local political processes—implicitly assume that
domestic practices or rights protections lag behind international legal norms.
For the right to claim innocence, in contrast, it is international law that is
playing catch-up. Additionally, it is entirely possible to define this right in a
way that draws inspiration from, and is compatible with, a range of national
criminal process models.
Our review of the right to claim innocence also shows that rights
inflation critiques often fail to meaningfully distinguish the types of
processes that lead to “new” rights or to recognize how such processes can
themselves mitigate concerns about rights inflation. For example, it is
difficult to see how the international human rights enterprise will be
“diminished by over-printing”304 in the context of derivative rights that, by
definition, operate within the confines of existing rights guarantees and are
limited by the parent right(s) from which they evolve.305 As we have shown,
297. See Rosa Freedman & Jacob Mchangama, Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: The
Proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures Mandates, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 164, 190–91 (2016)
(noting that some nations have at various times used expanding economic and social rights as a
“smokescreen” to divert attention from violations of civil and political rights).
298. See John Tasioulas, Are Human Rights Taking Over the Space Once Occupied by Politics?,
NEW STATESMAN (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.newstatesman.com/2019/08/are-human-rights-takingover-space-once-occupied-politics [https://perma.cc/LVV5-V3TG] (arguing that “[t]here is a persistent
tendency to present more and more political demands as human rights, but on very dubious grounds”).
299. Id.
300. See Hurst Hannum, Reinvigorating Human Rights for the Twenty-First Century, 16 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 409, 439 (2016) (“[S]ubstituting the adversarial absolutism of rights language for the often more
fruitful path of dialogue and open political debate may make it less likely that society will be able to
arrive at viable solutions.”).
301. See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 107 (2013) (“[A]s the
[human rights] system has expanded its . . . obligations . . . many inconsistencies have emerged between
provisions [which] . . . . create problems for the interpretation of the law.”).
302. See, e.g., Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 297, at 190–91 (arguing that states promote
“new” economic, social, and cultural rights to “divert attention away from [their] gross and systemic
violations” of civil and political rights).
303. See JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 212–13 (2008) (arguing that the “ballooning” of the
right to life to encompass a “basic welfare provision” and “a fully flourishing life” obscures what the
right demands of states and what individuals can expect to be protected).
304. Dudai, supra note 294, at 18.
305. See, e.g., von der Decken & Koch, supra note 122, at 13 (noting that where rights are derived
from existing rights, “the new right remains limited by the old right”); Gilbert, supra note 257, at 99

362

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:311

framing the right to claim innocence as a derived right helps to concretize
several longstanding criminal process guarantees (such as the right to claim
compensation for miscarriages of justice) that implicitly assume the
existence of domestic mechanisms to adjudicate factual and legal innocence
claims.
The processes of derivation that apply to the right to claim innocence
also alleviate other inflation critiques. For example, reliance on existing
guarantees minimizes concerns about circumventing political or social
processes to push through new international norms. Derivation also enables
a reading together of rights to clarify definitions and avoid normative
inconsistencies that may exist within or across countries.306 The emphasis on
indivisibility and interdependence that comes with derivative approaches, in
turn, reduces opportunities for governments to weaken compliance by
picking and choosing among rights. Relying on existing guarantees also
brings with it access to built-in monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that
reduce the opportunities for noncompliance and weaken the international
human rights system. Finally, grounding the right to claim innocence on
foundational principles—such as the rights to a remedy and to a fair trial—
makes it difficult to argue that recognizing such a right “ends up eroding the
legitimacy” of these core guarantees.307
While rights derivation processes make it especially difficult to sustain
most rights inflation critiques, recognition of the right to claim innocence as
a stand-alone right provides additional nuance to the rights inflation debate.
As previously explained, one justification for a freestanding right to claim
innocence is the widespread national-level support for remedying wrongful
convictions. The fact that domestic mechanisms are ahead of international
recognition lowers barriers to acceptance by all governments and
undermines rights inflation critiques that argue that rights are used to
circumvent domestic preferences. Stand-alone recognition also achieves
other salutary goals, such as signaling the normative importance of the new
right, avoiding protection gaps that result from relying solely on existing
guarantees, enhancing the clarity of state obligations, and highlighting the
influence of a range of stakeholders.
In sum, recognizing a right to claim innocence showcases the
legitimacy of an international legal system that appropriately evolves in
response to new concerns and new types of violations. Seen from this
(stating that the limiting effect of parent rights can render new rights “invisible under human rights law”).
306. See Lorna McGregor, Daragh Murray & Vivian Ng, International Human Rights Law as a
Framework for Algorithmic Accountability, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 309, 326–27 (2019).
307. Cf. IGNATIEFF, supra note 291, at 90.
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perspective, “[t]he universality of human rights is characterised by a constant
fixing and unfixing of what universal rights concepts are.”308 This evolution
is central to the meaningful, continued protection of fundamental
entitlements for all individuals.
CONCLUSION
Explicit recognition of an international right to claim innocence would
close an important gap in existing human rights law, one that a wide range
of countries are attempting to fill in response to a surge of wrongful
convictions and advocacy efforts by the transnational innocence movement.
Post-conviction claims of factual innocence—allegations that the
wrong person was convicted or that no crime occurred at all—are closely
linked to several human rights that protect individuals charged with criminal
offenses. Treaties and other international instruments have long recognized
the violation of these guarantees as a basis for legal innocence claims—
including assertions that unfair trials, insufficient evidence, or basic
procedural errors require overturning a conviction. Nevertheless,
international law has not developed a comprehensive or consistent set of
protections for another foundational principle—that individuals who have
been wrongfully convicted in a factual sense have a right to seek the same
remedy.
This Article makes three contributions to support the full recognition of
this right. First, we explain how innocence claims fit within, and have been
adapted to, a range of civil and common law criminal systems, focusing on
three national models—post-conviction, appellate, and administrative.
Second, we develop the normative, analytical, and empirical case for an
international right to claim innocence, explaining the benefits of doing so in
light of the leading approaches for recognizing “new” human rights. Third,
we offer a draft text of the new right, address key definitional issues, and
respond to anticipated arguments against “rights inflation” in international
law.
We conclude by emphasizing the broader implications of our proposal.
Across the world, there is a convergence in thinking about criminal
procedure issues in human rights terms. Despite nationalist and populist
backlash, many governments and civil society groups are increasingly aware
of the connections between racial and economic injustice and the criminal
process. Safeguarding the accuracy of the criminal legal system is one way
to help achieve these essential goals.
308. KATHRYN MCNEILLY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RADICAL SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: FUTURITY,
ALTERITY, POWER 63 (2017).
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The universality of human rights must evolve to take account of new
demands and new concerns. International law’s innocence gap is partly a
historical byproduct of when leading human rights instruments were drafted.
Such an instrument adopted today would likely not omit this right, given the
growing recognition in many countries that wrongful convictions are an
urgent yet inadequately addressed concern. The time has come to close
international law’s innocence gap and provide meaningful remedies for the
wrongfully convicted.

